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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Abstract 
This study investigates both the trade-offs among system reliability improve­
ment, resource consumption, and other relevant constraints, and the application of 
statistical control methods to monitor variations. A process for reliability-related 
quality programming is developed to fill existing gaps in software design and devel­
opment so that a quality programming plan can be achieved. A software reliability-
to-cost relation is developed both from a software reliability-related cost model and 
software redundancy models with common-cause failures. The software reliability 
optimization problem will be formulated into a mixed-integer programming problem 
and solved by a branch-and-bound technique. 
A procedure will be developed to identify, define, develop, and demonstrate a 
quality performance measure to improve system operation that is based on statis­
tical control methods. Despite the most painful effort to control product quality, 
variation in product quality is unavoidable. Through the use of process control 
techniques, such as statistical control chart, unusual variations in the software de­
velopment process can be controlled and reduced. 
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1.2 Research Problem 
Software technology has been criticized for its high cost, low reliability, and 
frequent delays. Forty percent of software development costs are spent in testing 
to remove errors [9] and assure high quality, but in fact, high cost and delays are 
still cited as the results of low reliability. By focusing on the overall system, we 
can improve low system reliability (1) by debugging the program or (2) by adding 
redundant components. Module testing, integration testing, and field testing rep­
resent the first approach, while N-version programming, recovery block, redundant 
data structure, and redundant data storage are examples of the second approach. 
The techniques of using more reliable components and adding redundancies to 
improve system reliability have been widely used in hardware systems. Nevertheless, 
software differs from hardware in terms of failure causes and reliability modeling 
measures. Therefore, the conventional techniques for modeling hardware systems 
cannot be directly applied to software performance modeling. Because many sys­
tems include a significant proportion of software and because over sixty percent of 
the system life-cycle cost has been spent on software-related factors, there is an 
urgent need to evaluate the performance of integrated software modules to meet 
optimal design specifications. This is, however, a sophisticated task because 
• the system has many restrictions, such as cost, manpower, management, 
scheduling, processing time, computer memory, facilities 
• no methodology addresses and monitors software quality and development 
• no dynamic optimization procedure exists to locate solutions for a complicated 
mixed-integer-type programming problem 
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• no systematic and generic protocol can be used to evaluate and feed back 
performance of quality programming. 
1.3 Objectives of The Research 
The objective of this study is to perform optimally a complete software life-
cycle analysis incorporating the principles of optimization and statistical quality 
control. The research consists of the following two topics. 
1. Optimal Allocation of Software Reliability and Redundancy 
To integrate software components into an optimization problem, The following 
issues must be investigated. 
• provide reliability-related quality programming process 
• predict system performance 
• develop the software reliability-related cost function 
• develop the software redundancy model with common cause failures 
• formulate the software reliabiUty optimization 
• derive other reliability-related resources function 
• optimize reliability-redundancy allocation 
2. Software Quality Management 
Through the use of process control techniques, the variation in the software 
development process can be controlled and reduced. To set up a procedure to 
identify, define, monitor, and control software quality, the following must be 
investigated. 
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• plan the statistical software quality control procedure with each specified 
step related to a development activity 
• investigate input domain testing process 
• use of statistical quality control techniques 
• specify the software quality variation outcomes 
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2 AN OVERVIEW OF QUALITY PROGRAMMING 
Quality programming is a means to perform optimally a complete software 
life-cycle analysis incorporating the principles of optimization and statistical quality 
control. A diagram of the reliability-related quality programming process is depicted 
in Figure 2.1. In the following, those development phases of Figure 2.1 that are not 
covered in current software practice will be discussed in order to perform optimally a 
complete software life-cycle analysis that incorporates the principles of optimization. 
2.1 Modeling 
Modeling is the first and most important step in quality programming devel­
opment process. In modeling phase, an accurate picture of the problem must be 
developed to gain as broad a perspective of the problem as possible at the outset. 
All aspects of input, output, and processing must be studied carefully to prevent 
the original problem from being destroyed by misleading opinions, considerable ir­
relevant information. 
It is the study of all the factors necessary to understand the problem, to gen­
erate a quality solution, and to allow the use of statistical quality control. A model 
for software development is like a model performed in the manufacturing industries. 
The modeling factors discussed by [12] are: 
Modeling of inputs 
- types of inputs 
- characteristics of each type of input 
- rules for constructing inputs 
- sources of inputs 
Modeling of outputs 
- output description 
- output prototype design 
- output strategies 
- output quality planning 
Modeling of software 
- process description 
- rules of using inputs 
- methods of producing outputs 
- data flows in a process being automated 
- process control 
- software characteristics 
- methods of developing the software system 
INTERMEDIATE" 
RESOURCES 
CROSS-CHECK 
SOFTWARE ACCEPTANCE 
MODELING 
RESOURCE 
REALLOCATION 
VERIFICATION 
VALIDATION 
REQUIREMENTS 
SPECIFICATION 
SOFTWARE 
PROBLEM 
DESCRIPTION 
SYSTEM 
OPTIMIZATION 
SYSTEM 
PERFORMANCE 
PREDICTION 
CONCURRENT 
CODING. TESTING 
AND MANAGEMENT 
CONCURRENT 
SOFTWARE DESIGN 
AND TEST DESIGN 
Figure 2.1: A process for reliability-related quality programming 
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2.2 Requirement Specification 
The second step in a quality programming development process is the require­
ment specification. In this phase, the problem should be analyzed by a step-by-step 
procedure and documented in detail to cover all necessary requirements and to 
obtain detailed qualitative and quantitative characteristics of these inputs and out­
puts. 
The result of the requirement specification phase of quality programming de­
velopment must be a formal document that completely describes the solution, using 
both words and diagrams. This document can be used to communicate to the pro­
grammer, software designer, test designer, system optimizer, failure-identification 
personnel, failure-correction personnel, user, and other concerned parties. 
The volume of the document varies dramatically from software to software, 
depending on system complexity, size, and contractual requirements. The require­
ment specification activity includes software requirements, test requirements, and 
documentation requirements [12]. 
2.2.1 Software requirement 
In the modeling phase it was sufficient to understand and identify the input, 
processing, and output quantities. The next software requirement phase should 
specify the detailed input, processing, and output requirements for design of the 
software. In conventional practice, the requirements for the following equalities has 
been poorly or insufficiently specified. 
• Input description is the nature or extent of data 
9 
• Definition of product unit is the user's detailed output requirement 
• Product unit defectiveness is the criterion of acceptability. 
The above requirement specifications should be stated carefully by the statis­
tical quality control. 
2.2.2 Test requirement 
specification of test methods The test methods are regular test, weighted test, 
boundary test, invalid test, and special test method. A combination of the 
methods is required to conduct the tests. 
statistical inference requirements The user should require that proper data be 
collected in order to perform the necessary statistical tests. 
statistical sampling methods The user should specify the most appropriate sta­
tistical sampling methods consistent with the product unit definitions devel­
oped as part of the modeling activity. A sampling process for estimating the 
defective rate of the product unit and another sampling process for accepting 
the software product unit should be used. 
software acceptance criteria How good the product unit population must be 
and how thorough the system testing must be to satisfy the developer and the 
user that the software is acceptable and has been sufficiently tested. 
The above factors should be carefully addressed and specified for both sys­
tem test requirement and module test requirement. By doing this, both user and 
developer would have statistical evidence that quality is built into the software. 
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2.2.3 Documentation requirement 
The type of documents should be identified and specified in detail. The product 
description, in textual or blueprint form, written instruction (process description) 
are fundamental tools to help ensure the understandability and quality of software. 
2.3 System Performance Prediction 
Use of data from the past history of similar environments can help predict the 
results of future experiments. The data, called the indices of -performance, should 
be provided in order to conduct system performance prediction. The management 
realizes that all production personnel are part of the system and so are their prob­
lems. Therefore, an effort to collect the indices of performance should be done in 
advance to improve future product. On the basis of the past indices of performance, 
the system failure intensity or system failure rate under a specified condition can 
be predicted. 
2.4 System Pre-optimization 
The number of redundancies of each subsystem needs to be determined before 
the design phase begins; this is because all redundancies are supposed to developed 
independently from the design phase. By the use of data estimated from the system 
performance prediction phase, the system optimization problem can be formulated 
and solved. The procedure of pre-optimization is the same as that of main system 
optimization which is conducted in the middle of coding, testing, and management 
phase. A solution obtained at the system pre-optimization phase gives management 
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a general idea of system design. 
2.5 Concurrent Software Design and Test Design 
The concurrent development for both software design and test design is advan­
tageous because it allows cross-checking of the designs as early as possible and it 
can reduce the development time considerably. 
2.5.1 Software design 
The designer must keep in mind the software engineering goals of modifiability, 
understandability, reliability, and efficiency as he or she proceeds with the software 
design. The software engineering principles of abstract data typing, information 
hiding, modularization, localization, uniformity, completeness, conformability, and 
statistical quality control must be observed carefully in developing the design [12]. 
In this study, a general guideline for producing a quality software design, in­
cluding numerous design tools and techniques, is shortly discussed. Because design 
is a very personalized and highly interactive process we shall leave the choice of 
these tools and techniques to the reader. 
2.5.1.1 Modern software design methods 
top-down design The characteristics are: 
• At each level, the details of the design at lower levels are hidden. Only 
the necessary data and control are defined. 
• Make a module small enough that it is within a programmer's intellectual 
span of control (about 50 lines). 
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• The design error will not be discovered until the end of the design process. 
structured programming The characteristic is the use of a single-entry and a 
single-exit control structure to provide a well-defined, clear, and simple ap­
proach to program design. Since it eliminates GO TO statements completely, 
the program structure is often vastly complicated and sometimes makes the 
running time longer. The type of structured programming are SEQUENCE, 
IF THEN ELSE, DO WHILE, and so on. 
modular design A module means a modest-sized subprogram which performs in­
dependently on specific function. A top-down design results in a modular 
design. 
2.5.1.2 Design representations techniques There are almost 18 differ­
ent techniques so that a group of techniques is commonly used for designing a 
software system. 
flow charts There are two types of flow charts. First, the high-level flow chart is 
used to represent the flow of the logic. The high-level flow chart contains only 
control structures. Second, the detailed flow charts is used for the detail of 
logic. Each symbol of the detailed flow chart represents a single line of code. 
pseudo-code (metacode) Pseudo-code which consists of a shorthand notation for 
control structure is a detailed subsection of high-level flowchart. Therefore, 
pseudo-code technique is more flexible and clear than flow chart technique. 
HIPO diagrams Hierarchy plus Input-Process-Output diagram consists of one H 
block diagram and a set of the overview IPO and detailed IPO diagram. 
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Warnier-Orr Diagram This diagram utilizes nested sets of braces, some pseudo­
code, logic symbols. 
A recommended design representation technique [61] is: 
• An H diagram is drawn and major subprograms are identified. 
• High-level flow charts are drawn for control structures and each major sub­
program. 
• Pseudo-code is written for each flowchart. 
• The program (code) is written in the source language. 
2.5.2 Test design 
When the software modeling and requirements specification documents are 
sufficiently prepared, the necessary procedure for test design is to review and refine 
those documents. This procedure is applicable both to the entire software system 
and to the modules of the system. 
2.6 Concurrent Coding, Testing, and Management 
Each system module should be tested with the statistical quality control tool 
as soon as it is coded, and therefore the system can be built on a "secure-quality-
module" basis. By using the SIAD (Symbolic Input Attribute Decomposition) tree 
we can represent the input domain in a convenient form and can easily trace back 
the location of faults. Moreover, we may use the various statistical control charts 
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to find system variation. Once the variation of system is detected, the assignable 
causes (especially common cause) of variation need to be identified and eliminated 
by the use of cause and effect diagram. 
2.7 System Optimization 
In developing a fault-tolerant software, the software engineers have to consider 
the trade-offs among reliability improvement, resource consumption, and other rel­
evant constraints. An optimal design is needed to maximize the system reliability 
under the restricted resources. The system optimization problem is formulated sub­
ject to various restricted resources. The value of decision variables (component's 
reliabilities and the number of redundancies of each subsystem) can be determined 
when the system optimization problem is solved. The predetermined value of deci­
sion variables may be varied later as the development phase moves forward. 
2.8 Software Acceptance 
In the middle of concurrent coding and test phase, the system and component 
reliabilities are examined. Since more information about the developing software, 
such as failure intensity or failure rate, are readily available at this time, more 
accurate system and component reliabilities can be reevaluated with updated data. 
If the system and module reliabilities do not meet the reliabilities required, 
reallocate the resources and solve the system optimization problem again with the 
updated data. A set of solutions along with determined decision variables will be ob­
tained. The management chooses a solution among the new multi-optimal solutions 
obtained. The decision to be made is whether to improve module's reliabilities or 
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to increase the number of redundancies of some modules through manageable ways. 
This iteration continues until the current reliabilities meet the requirement. 
2.9 Resource Reallocation 
It is obvious that the component's failure rates of different stages (subsystems) 
are different. When an optimal solution is chosen, each component has its own 
projected reliability. Since the failure rates of each component are different, the 
time required to reach the projected component reliability is also different. Residual 
resources should be reallocated on the basis of those times required. Assigning 
accurate amount of resources to each stage at the beginning can eventually save 
development cost, time, and efforts. 
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3 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE PREDICTION 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the main objective of the system op­
timization for quality programming is to determine the number of redundancies 
and reliability of each subsystem under the given various resources available. The 
management is supposed to choose a solution from among the new multi-optimal 
solutions obtained at the system optimization stage. To make the management's 
decision reasonable and efficient, the number of redundancies of each subsystem 
needs to be determined before the design phase begins; this is because all redun­
dancies are supposed to be developed independently from design phase. The initial 
decision on the number of redundancies of each subsystem doesn't need to be very 
accurate, but close enough (1) to increase the number of redundancies later with­
out reallocating the major man power for new redundancies, or (2) to decrease the 
number of redundancies without wasting major effort. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe techniques that can be used to pre­
dict the system performance (e.g., failure rate) at the end of specification phase. As 
computer scientists try to analyze the software problem and the quality of the prod­
uct, one of their first steps in the solution is to measure the software's complexity. 
Many attempts to quantify the complexity of software have been made [6,5,8,11|. 
Belady, in his survey on complexity, listed over 60 techniques which have ap­
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peared in the literature [8]. Section 3.2 will discuss some important techniques and 
focus in depth on Halstead's equation. Section 3.3 will discuss how can the complex­
ity be converted to the number of errors in the program and how does the estimated 
initial number of errors relate to the system performance prediction. Finally, the 
indices of performance which makes the estimation of the system performance closer 
to the true software system performance will be discussed in Section 3.4. 
3.1 Notation 
a slope of the line in Fig. 3.1 
c constant 
E effort measure 
f r  relative frequency of occurrence for type r 
H information content 
N program length (total operators plus operands) in Halstead length 
equation 
n total tokens 
Tir frequency of occurrence of rank r 
r  rank 
t  number of distinct types of operators plus that of operands 
T]i number of distinct operator types appearing in an algorithm 
772 number of distinct operand types appearing in an algorithm 
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3.2 Review of Complexity 
Types of complexity are (1) size or bulk, which can be measured by the num­
ber of instructions; (2) difficulty of text, which can be measured by the number of 
different type of operators and operands; (3) structural complexity, which can be 
measured by the graph properties of control structure; and (4) intellectual complex­
ity, which can be measured by the algorithmic difficulty. 
3.2.1 Zipf's law of natural language 
Before the Halstead's equation is discussed it is better to check the background 
of program length estimation, so called, the Zipf's law of natural language. Laws 
of this nature were first studied by Zipf in connection with natural languages. He 
studied the relationship between frequency of occurrence rir and rank r for words 
from English, Chinese, and the Latin of Plautus. The relationship between rir and 
r is depicted in Fig 3.1. Derivation of length equation (n) is as follows: 
log f r  = log c - a log r  
log /r • r® = log c  
f r  = c {cons tant ) .  
If a = 1, then 
f r - r  - c 
Ur 
— • r  =  c  
n  
Ur = —. (3.1) 
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10.000 
i-iooo 
English words 
100 
Latin words 
100 1000 10 
rank r 
Figure 3.1: Occurrences frequency vs. rank 
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If we take the summation of both sides of Eq. 3.1 we get 
t  
nr  =  cn  ^  -. (3.2) 
r=l r=\  
The summation of the series 1/r is given as follows: 
è " i2((iV 1) + • • • (3 3) 
Substitution of Eq. 3.3 (retaining only two terms for modest-sized t) into Eq. 3.2 
yields an expression for the constant c in terms of t. 
^ 0.5772 +In f 
In most cases the rarest type will occur only once, in other words, — 1-
Since = 1 and r  =  t ,  we can get another equation for constant c from Eq. 3.1. 
c = — (3.5) 
n 
By substituting Eq. 3.5 into Eq. 3.4 we can get a length equation in terms of t. 
M = ((0.5772 + In f) (3.6) 
This equation tells that if we know the number of distinct type t, we can estimate 
the number of total tokens n. 
(Example) Let's estimate the length of an article which has 200 different word 
types. 
n = 200(0.5772 4- In 100) = 1037 words long. 
(Zipf's second law) In the tail of Zipf's law, there are generally several identical 
rir values which make plateau of types, each with the same nr- Therefore, the 
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Zipf's first law can be modified as follows: 
n =-^(0.5772 +In (3.7) 
Shooman and Laemmel [63] have shown that Zipf's law length equation has 
about 25% overall agreement in the estimation of program length for several software 
examples. Although it is not a good idea to use Zipf's law for the prediction of 
system reliability, this law is simple to use and gives a general concept for estimating 
program length early in the design phase. 
3.2.2 Halstead length equation 
Halstead [28] in his work found that for a nontrivial class of algorithms there 
is a quantitative relationship between operators and operands and their usage. He 
assumed that a program is a sequence of symbols, made up of alternating operator 
and operand symbols. In other words, the program can be generated by a stochastic 
process. 
The procedure of Halstead length equation generation will be introduced in 
final report. 
Halstead length equation is 
iV = 771 log2^ + V2 log2^ (3.8) 
Halstead's measurements are somewhat closer than those of Zipf. The overall 
agreement is about 14%. More data on significant sized real-world programs should 
be used to investigate the accuracy of the Halstead length equation. However, this 
equation can play an even more important role if it can be used for estimating 
program performance early in the design process. 
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3.2.3 Other complexity models 
Other complexity rhodels are Halstead's effort function (E), Shannon's infor­
mation theory, and the graphic complexity model, and the like. 
•  H = logi  
• cyclomatic complexity 
• knot complexity 
• polynomial complexity 
These deterministic models empirically measure the qualitative attributes of a 
software and are used in the early phase of the software life cycle to predict the 
number of errors in a program. 
3.3 Complexity vs. Number of Errors 
Complexity measurement estimates and predicts the number of errors in the 
program. Four different hypotheses necessary to convert complexity measure to 
number of errors are: 
• Length hypothesis: the number of bugs per statement (e.g., machine language 
statement is equal to one operator plus one operand). 
• Information hypothesis: the number of bugs per information content (H). 
• Effort measure: the number of bugs per effort (E). 
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• Akiyama's hypothesis: the number of bugs per the number of decisions plus 
the number of subroutine calls. 
The proportionality constants should be carefully calculated. 
3.4 The Indices of Performance 
For more accurate estimation of system performance, other facts, aside from 
the program length, should be considered. The indices of performance related to 
the program complexity itself are 
• program length 
• language level 
• interrelationship among instruction 
• others 
The indices of performance related to the developers are: 
• skill (personal working experience) 
• efforts (team communication, etc.) 
• consistency 
• others 
An effort to collect the ind ices  o f  per formance  should be made in advance to 
improve the future product. At the end of the specification phase, the system failure 
intensity or system failure rate under a specified condition can be approximately 
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predicted on the basis of the past ind ices  o f  per formance .  A set of data obtained 
from the system performance prediction phase can be used to optimize the system. 
An optimal solution obtained from the system pre-optimization phase could be 
different from the one obtained from the system optimization phase. However, the 
management can have a general idea of system design before the design phase begins. 
A set of equations which make the estimation of the system performance closer to 
the true system performance of underdeveloping software need to be investigated 
further. 
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4 OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF SOFTWARE RELIABILITY AND 
REDUNDANCY 
To integrate software components into an optimization problem, two issues 
should be investigated. First, a software reliability-related cost function has to 
be chosen so that components can be incorporated into the constraint function 
to represent the amount of resources required to reach a certain reliability level. 
Second, the reliability function of software redundancy with common-cause failure 
has to be determined so that it can be incorporated into the objective function of 
the optimization problem. The following notation will be used in this chapter. 
4.1 Notation 
a,b unknown parameters of nonhomogeneous Poisson model 
h amount of resource i available 
Cl  cost per unit calendar time associated with failure detection 
C2 cost per unit calendar time associated with failure elimination 
software reliability cost function of resource i at stage j 
hardware reliability cost function of resource i at stage j 
H,S set of hardware and software stages, respectively 
redundancy cost function of resource i at stage j 
26 
k redundant component cost coefficient 
N initial number of bugs in program 
probability of being in state k in Markov model 
Rj (rj, Xj ) reliability of stage j 
RC(A,A*) cost of reliability improvement from A to A* 
r denotes reliability in general 
reliability and projected reliability of stage j, respectively 
s operational time, s > 0 
t debugging time 
t r  resource usage parameter per CPU hr (person hr/CPU hr) 
Xj number of components at stage j 
a, /3  failure rate ratio 
Aj the Lagrange multipliers 
A,A* current and projected failure rate, respectively 
A^ failure rate of the independent component 
( A^ = A ^ = Ag, in the two component case ) 
A^ failure rate of the common-cause of i components 
A(t) program failure rate after t units of debugging time 
/Li(t),m(t) expected number of faults removed after t units of 
debugging time 
Ht  resource usage parameter per failure (person hr/failure) 
$ unknown parameter of JM model 
— denotes a vector 
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4.2 Review of Software Reliability Model 
The definition of software reliability chosen is the one offered by Boehm [9]. 
Software possesses reliability to the extent that it can be expected to 
perform its intended functions satisfactory. 
The objectives of this survey of the software reliability model may be summa­
rized by the following; 
• Determine what software structural and development characteristics are avail­
able for analysis of software reliability. 
• Define improved methods for collecting reliability data. 
• Based on error histories seen in the data, define sets of error categories. 
• Perform a survey of existing software reliability models. 
4.2.1 Software reliability vs. hardware reliability 
Because the basic modeling techniques of software reliability are adapted from 
reliability theory developed for hardware systems, a comparison of software relia­
bility and hardware reliability help in the use of these theories and in the study of 
hardware and software systems. 
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4.2.2 Classification of software reliability model 
Many ways of classifying software reliability models have been proposed. Soft­
ware reliability models can be classified into the deterministic model and the prob­
abilistic model. Performance measures of the deterministic model are obtained by 
analyzing the program texture and do not involve any random event. These deter­
ministic models empirically measure the qualitative attributes of a software and are 
used in the early phase of the software life cycle to predict the number of errors in 
a program or are used in the maintenance phase for assessing and controlling the 
quality of a software. 
The probabilistic model represents the failure occurrences and the fault removal 
as probabilistic events. 
4.3 Software Reliability-Cost Function Development 
The software reliability-related cost function represents the resources required 
to improve the reliabihty of the software. For the bug-counting model, software 
reliability is a function of the number of initial faults and debugging time. Thus, 
the cost of improving a software from one reliability level to another can be related 
to the number of faults removed during the debugging period, as well as to the 
debugging time. 
As indicated by Musa et al. [50], failure-identification personnel, failure-correction 
personnel, and computer time are the three key cost factors involved in debugging. 
By associating the resources of failure-identification personnel and computer time 
with At, and the resources of failure-identification personnel, failure-correction per­
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sonnel, and computer time with A/i, we can formulate a software reliability-related 
cost function as follows: 
i?C(A, A*) = (4.1) 
The formulations of the extra debugging time (At) and that of the extra faults 
removed (A/x) to reach A* from A depend on the choice of the software reliability 
model. In this study, two important software reliability models have been employed 
to formulate the At and A/Li. 
First of all, the Jelinski-Moranda (JM) model [36] is used because this is one 
of the earliest and probably the most commonly used model for assessing software 
reliability. Next, because of its simplicity and applicability over a wide range of 
testing situations, the Goel-Okumoto nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) 
model [25] is used. 
Time between failures models like JM model make following assumptions which 
are unrealistic. 
1. The instantaneous failure rate of software is proportional to the number of 
errors remaining in it, each of which is equally likely to cause the next failure. 
2. The time separations between failures are statistically independent and dis­
tributed exponentially with different failure rates. 
However, fault count models, typically, Goel-Okumoto NHPP model, assumes 
that the failure process is a nonhomogeneous Poisson process. This model replaces 
assumptions 1 and 2 above with those corresponding to the structure of a Poisson 
process. The interfailure times are no longer independent, and the instantaneous 
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failure rate between failures varies with time. Some software development teams 
have successfully used this model to predict the number of remaining faults. 
4.3.1 Jelinski-Moranda model 
The software hazard function, or the failure rate during the time between 
the (i-l)st and ith failures, is given by 
Z( t i )  =  \=  $(JV - (i - 1)1 (4.2) 
Since this hazard function is constant, the number of faults discovered can be 
easily expressed in terms of the failure rate: 
( i - 1 )  =  i v - x  $ 
i  =  14-jV - ^  (4.3) 
Let \ j  be the projected failure rate, then 
A. 
j  =  l  + N (4.4) 
The extra number of faults needed to be removed to reach the projected failure 
rate from the current failure rate is 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
of faults removed to reach 
Aj t i  =  j  -  i  
A; 
= 1 +  N $ 
Either Eq. 4.5 or Eq. 4.6 can be used to get the number 
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Also, the expected extra debugging time required can be expressed in terms of 
the failure rate. The total debugging time observed up to (i-l)st fault discovery is 
i -1  i -1  1 
E ^ 
k=l  fc=l ^ 
because the MTTF is the reciprocal proportion of failure rate. The total debugging 
time required to reach the projected failure rate Xj is 
j-1 i-1 1 
k=l  6=1 ^  
Therefore, the extra debugging time required to reach Xj  becomes 
j - i  i -1  
At = ~ "ïl 
k=l  fc=l 
= 
k=l  ^  6=1 ^  
1 
Eq. 4.7 can be rewritten in terms of A.-, so that At of a given Xj  can be directly 
Xj  
evaluated. Since j  =  1  +  N — 
i - 1  
At  =  Y .  
A - (& -1)1 
" £ «1^ -{k-1)1 
In some cases, the reliability objective is based on the reliability level of a 
given operation time. To formulate the reliability-related cost function of this type. 
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f a  1  l u r e  
r a t e  
(N-l)i{i * 
(N-3)* 
(N-4 . 
tw 
Execution time 
Figure 4.1: A typical plot of Z{t i )  for the JM model 
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reliability can be represented as a function of debugging time plus operation time. 
The system reliability r(s) after the ith failure occurs is 
ri(,) = (4.9) 
To represent the number of faults discovered in terms of the system reliability, 
In r^-(s) = -X-s 
^  ^  I n r i ( s )  (4.10) 
Substitute Eq. 4.10 into Eq. 4.3; then, 
i = 1 + AT + (4.11) 
Let r j ( s )  be the system reliability desired; then, 
lnr,-(s) 
J = l + JV+-^ (4.12) 
Therefore, the extra number of faults removed to reach the system reliability 
required is 
An = j-i = ^[Inrj(j) - Inrj(s)] (4.13) 
Eq. 4.13 can be rewritten in terms of the parameters available and the system 
reliability required. 
In7';(5) 
= 1 + N -  i+ (4.14) 
Also, the extra debugging time required to reach r j { s )  after ith fault discovery 
is 
J —1 i—1 
= T ,  h  -  h-
k=l  k=l  
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From Eq. 4.12, let M be j-1, then 
In 7-J (a) 
M = j -  l  — N- \  ^— (4.15) 
Therefore, 
M 1 
- { k - 1)1 
4.3.2 Goel-Okumoto nonhomogeneous Poisson process model 
In this model Goel and Okumoto [25] assumed that a software system is subject 
to failures at random times caused by faults present in the system. The following 
form of the model was proposed 
P [ N { t )  =  y ]  =  = 0,1,2,... (4.17) 
When the Goel-Okumoto NHPP model is used, the expected number of faults 
removed after debugging time t is 
m[i)  = a[l - e~^^]  (4.18) 
and the program failure rate at intermediate debugging time t is 
X { t )  =  m ' { t )  = abe~^^ .  (4.19) 
Therefore, the debugging time t and the debugging time <*, to reach the pro­
jected failure rate A*, can be represented in terms of failure rate. Since InA = 
ln(a6)  -  bt ,  
t  = -[ln(a6) - In A]. (4.20) 
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and 
t*  =  ^ [ ln{ab)~\nX*] .  (4.21) 
Additionally, the expected number of faults removed, to reach A* can 
be represented as 
m{t*)  = a(l — ) 
= o[l - g-(ln(a6)-lnA*)j 
-
A* 
= O — -g-, (4.22) 
Let the objective failure rate be A*, the current time be t, and the current 
failure rate be A, the extra debugging time required and the extra faults removed 
to reach A* from A are 
= t*  - t  
= i(lnA-lnA*) 
0 
Am = a{e-^^ 
(4.23) 
= ae — In  ab  gin A _ gin A* 
A > A*. (4.24) 
Let Sj^ be the time between failures (k-l)th and kth, and be the time to k 
failures, then it can be shown that the conditional reliability function of Sf^, given 
h-1  = 
= exp  
—a e  -b t  _  -6(<+s (4.25) 
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To represent t in terms of r(s|i), 
-b t  _  -b{ t+3)  ^  lnr{s \ t )  
e-^ t  _  g-6< . ^ -bs  
( 1 _ 
, -h t  
-b t  = In 
lnr(a|<) 
a 
lnr(a|f) 
a 
lnr(a|f) 
'a(l 
- lnr(s|<) 
t  =  — 7 In 
b 
lnr{s \ t )  
a(l - e 
Similarly, m(t) can be represented in terms of r(a|f). Hence, 
m{t)  =  «(1 - e-W) 
= a 1 + 
- : a + 
lnr(s|<) 
a(l - e-^«) 
lnr(s|i) 
( l  -  e-bs)  • 
Therefore, 
Ai = 
Am = 
t *  -  t  
In -
In r { s \ t )  
a{ l  -  e-bs)  
T n { t * )  —  m { t )  
lnr(s|i*) lnr(a|<) 
— In I — 
lnr(a|(*) 
a(l _ p-bs  
{1-e-bs) (1 _ p—bs 
{ 1 - l - b s ^  [lnr(.K*)-lnr(3|t)l. 
(4.26) 
(4.27) 
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4.4 Software Redundancy Model 
In software development, redundancies are programs developed by different 
groups of people or different companies based on the same specifications. These 
programs are designed to perform the same function. In order to make the failures 
of redundant copies to be as independent as possible, different computer languages, 
development tools, development methodologies, and testing strategies may be ap­
plied to different redundant programs. 
Nevertheless, it has been shown that software redundancies are not totally 
independent [18,38]. Some input data will fail more than one redundancy because of 
the common errors made by different development teams. This partial independence 
of software redundancies can be represented by a common-cause model. Some 
specific common-cause models have been proposed, especially in the area of nuclear 
safety. The common-cause model for software redundancy is developed as follows. 
4.4.1 Two-component Markov model 
Because of common-cause failure, a system with two partially independent 
software components in parallel can be transformed into a series system with two 
independent components in parallel and a common-cause component as shown in 
Figure 4.2. The Markov model of this system with common-cause failure is shown 
in Figure 4.3 where the failure rates of each independent component are assumed 
to be the same. 
Let the state number of this Markov process be the number of components 
failed. Then, the differential equations of this Markov process are 
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Figure 4.2: Transformed two-component software redundancy 
Figure 4.3: Two-component Markov model with common-cause failure 
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Po( t )  =  -(2Ai + X2)PoW 
P{(1) = 2AiPo(') - APiCi) 
4(0 = A2F0W + AlflM 
^bC) + PiC) + ^ 2(0 = I 
with initial condition PQ{0) = 1. 
When the Laplace transform is taken, 
- 1 = -(2^1 + A2)PO('S) 
= 1/(5 + 2Ai + A2) 
and 
sPi{s )  =  2AIPO(5) - (Ai + A2)PI(S) 
_ -^1 I '^^2 
where 
s  +  A]^ +  A2 s  +  2A^ +  A2 
.4]^ = 2A]^/A]^ = 2 
.42 = 2A]^/ — A2 = —2. 
Taking the inverse Laplace transform, the state probabilities are 
Po(0 = e~(2Ai+A2)i 
Pl{ t )  =  2e~( '^ l+ ' ' ^2)^  -  2e~(2Ai+A2)< 
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The system reliability is 
Rsi t )  =  PQ{t)  +  Pi{ t )  
= - e-(2'\l+A2)< (4.28) 
By the use of matrix method, the same system reliability can be derived. The 
differential equations based on the Markov model can be expressed in terms of 
matrix. 
P'{ t )  = Ap{t )  
The transient matrix A for a two-component redundant system is 
— (2A^ + Ag) 0 0 
—(A^ -f A2) 0 
A2 (Ai + A2) 0 
with eigenvalues Eq = -(2A2 + A2), = -(A^ + A2), and E2 = 0. 
For every complex n  x  n  matrix A there exists a nonsingular matrix P such 
that the matrix 
J = P-^AP 
is in the canonical form 
J = 
^0 
JL 0 
0 ••• 
J'. n  
where J is called Jordan canonical form and it is a diagonal matrix with diagonal 
element of matrix A, i.e., 
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EQ 
J = El  
E  n  
A set of corresponding eigenvectors for a two-component redundant system is 
P = (PoÂ^2) 
The eigenvectors lead to three sets of linear equations associated with a set of three 
equations in three unknowns. 
(EvI - X)Pi = 0 ! = 0,1,2 
where Ej is an eigenvalue and I is the identity matrix. 
The values of the first vector Pq are the solution of the following simultaneous 
equations. 
(EoI-A)(Po)  
0 0 0 PqO 
—2A]^ — 0 — 0 
"•^2 ~(^1 + ^2) "(2-^1 + -^2) ^02 
Therefore, 
^0 = 
1 
- 2  
1 
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For Pi, 
(EiI-A)(Pi) 
-Ai 0 0 
-2\i 0 0 
-A2 -(A^ + A2) -(Aj + A2) 
^10 
fll 
Pn 
= 0 
Therefore, 
0 
-1 
1 
For P21 
(E2l-A)(P2) 
(2A1+A2) 0 0 
—2A^ 4-(A^ "T A2) 0 
-A2 ~(^1 + •^2) ^ 
^20 
P2\ 
P22 
= 0 
Therefore, 
P2 = 
Hence, the matrix P becomes 
P = (^0-^1^2) = 
1 0 0 
- 2  - 1  0  
1 1 1 
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The inverse matrix P~^ is the same as F and the matrix J becomes 
-(2^1 + -^2) 0 0 
^  0  — ( +  A 2 )  0  
0 0 0 
Using the initial conditions, 
PoW 1 
P(0) = PIM — 0 
PiW 0 
and 
fo(<) 1 0 0 e^Oi  0 0 1 0 0 1 
fï(<) = = -2 -1 0 0 0 -2 -1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Therefore, 
P2{t) = + 1. 
The system reliability is 
Rs{ t )  = 1 - P2{t )  = 
4.4.2 Three-component Markov model 
A system with three partially independent software components (A, B, and C) 
in parallel is shown in Figure 4.4. Since some input will cause one, two, or three 
components to fail, the failure rate of each software component (e.g., component 
A) can be broken down into an independent failure rate (A ^), two two-component 
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Figure 4.4: Three-component software redundancy 
common-cause failure rates and and a three-component common-cause 
failure rate (A A Venn diagram (Figure 4.5) can be introduced to provide a 
better picture of these failure rate divisions. 
Here, the system is operating as long as any entire circle among three circles 
is good. By assuming Aj^ = A^ = A^ = A^, A2 = A^^ = ^BC ~ 
and A 3  = A 45(7, a three-component Markov model with common-cause failure is 
shown in Figure 4.6. The differential equations and initial condition are as follows. 
-Pq'CO = -(3Ai + 3A2 + A3)Po(i) 
Pl'(t) = ZXiPQ{t) - (2Ai -F 3A2 + A3)Pi(<) 
P2'(t) = 3a2po(^) + 2(Ai -t- A2)Pi( 0  -  ( A ^  4 -  2 A 2  - r  
= ^3-^o(^) + (^2 + -^3)^1(0 + (-^1 + 2A2 -r A3)P2(0 
•Po(0 + -PiCO + -^2(0 + -^3(0 = 0 
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Figure 4.5: A Venn diagram of failure rate 
and initial conditions fQ(0) = 1,P]^(0) = P2(®) ~ -^3(0) = 0. 
Taking the Laplace transform, 
- -(3Ai + 3A2 + A3)PO(5) 
P b ( ^ )  =  l / ( s  +  3 A i  +  3 A 2  +  A 3 )  
and 
sPi(s) = 3AiPo(s) - (2Ai + 3A2 + A3)Pi(a) 
3AiPo(â) 
Pl i s )  =  
s  +  2A- j ^  "T  3A2  +  A3  
••^1 £2 
s  +  2A^ + 3A2 "1" A3 s  "T SA^ 4- 3A2 4" A3 
where 4l=3, v4.2=-3. And 
•s-P2(^) = (2Ai-t-2A2)PI(s) + 3A2PO(-3) - (Ai + 2A2 + A3)P2(S) 
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, = (2Ai + 2A2)Pi(^) + 3A2Po(a) 
(s + A;I^2A2 + A3) 
= I ^2 . ^3 
s "i" A2 2A2 "T Ag s + 2A2 -f- 3A2 "t" Ag 3 + 3A^ 3A2 -l- Ag 
where 
_ 3(2A^ + A2 + 3A2A2) _ 
^  ( A i  +  A 2 ) ( 2 A i  +  A 2 )  
6A? + 6A1Ao 
"  - ( A i + A 2 ) ( A I )  = - «  
6A? 4- 3Ai Ao 
=  - ( 2 A I - A 2 ) ( - A I )  = ' •  
Taking the inverse Laplace transform, the state probabihties are 
Pq(<) = 
Pl{ t )  = 3e~(2Ai+3A2+A3)i _ 3g-(3Ai+3A2-t-A3)< 
P2(0 = - 6e~(^^l"''^'^2+A3)i ^ 3g-(3Ai+3A2+A3)i 
The system reliability is 
Rs{ t )  =  PQ{ t )  +  P i i t )  +  P2{ t )  
= 3e"(^l"^^^2+'^3)^ - 3e-(2Ai4-3A2+A3)< (4.29) 
= +e-(^^l+^'^2+^3)^ (4.30) 
4.4.3 Four-component Markov model 
Based on the same argument, the four-component Markov model is shown in 
Figure 4.7 and the differential equations are as follows: 
^6(^) ~ ~(4Ai + 6A2 + 4A3 + A4)Po(i) 
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3X, 2 ( X j  +  X g )  +  2 ^ 2  +  X 3  
Figure 4.6: Three-component Markov model with common-cause failures 
3(X, + Xm) 
+ 2X„+X3)( 3JA1+3X2+3X3+X 
Figure 4.7: Four-component Markov model with common-cause failures 
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P[{ t )  =  4AjPo(0 — (3-^1 + 6A2 + 4A3 + A4)Pi(i) 
P2{ i )  = 6A2-PO(') + 3(A;|^ 4-A2)PI(0 ~ (2A]^ + 5A2 + 4A3 + A4)P2(i) 
— 4A3/'o(0 + 3(A2 + A3)P]^(f) 4-(2A]^ + 4A2 + 2A3)P2(0 
—(Ai  +  3A2 +  3A3 +  \ ^ )P2{ t )  
•^4(0 = •^4-^o(^) + ('^3'^4)'^l(0 + (-^2 + 2A3 + A4)P2(0 
4-(Ai + 3A2 + 3A3 + A4)P3(<) 
with initial conditions Pq(0)=1, Pi(0) = ^ 2(0) = ^3(0) = ^4(0) = 0. 
Taking the Laplace transform and then the inverse Laplace transform, the 
system reliabiUty is 
Rs  =  4e~(^ l+^ ' ^2+3 ' ^3+ ' ^4 ) ^  -  6e~(^ ' ^ l " ^ ^ ' ^2+4A3+A4) f  
4.4e~(3'^l+6A2+4A3+A4)i _ g-(4Ai-f6A2+4A3+A4)<_ (4.31) 
4.4.4 N-component Markov model with common-cause 
The model can be extended to a generic N-component model. Without making 
a significant discrepancy in system reliability, a simplified N-component Markov 
model can be considered and shown in Figure 4.8. In this simplified model, the 
only common-cause failures considered are the common-cause failures that cause 
all the redundancies to fail. This common-cause failure rate may represent the 
failure rate of system software. The system reliability of this simplified model can 
be derived from the preUminary analysis as follows: 
The differential equations of this Markov process are 
— -(-^A -f AC)Pjy(0 
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N-1 
X 
Figure 4.8; N-component Markov model with common-cause failure 
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= {k + - (&A + Ac)Pfc(i) k=N-l,..,l 
Poi i )  =  ^ c [P i { t )  +  ... + PNW]  + APi(i) 
Sf=0 PkW = 1 
Pjy(O) = 1 
Taking the Laplace transform and the inverse Laplace transform, the state 
probabilities can be derived as follows. 
sPjY(s) — 1 = —(iVA + Xc)P^{s) 
=  l / ( s  +  i V A - f - A c ) ;  
then, 
In addition. 
_  - { N X + X c ) t  (4.32) 
N X P j ^ { s )  -  [ { N  -  1)A + Xc]P j \ f_i{ s )  = sPjY_i{ s )  (4.33) 
then 
PiV-l(s) = 
s  + (iV — 1)A + Ac 
N N  
s  + (iV — 1 )A + Ac 5 + NX 4- Ac 
PiV-l(^) = ]ve" K ^ - l )A+Acl( _ jvg-(ArA+Ac)< (4.34) 
In general, the state probabilities and the system reliability can be derived as 
follows. 
N 
Pk i ^ )  = É 
j=k  
N \ ,  N  
V ' p='2,p^i 
\ 
(4.35) 
/ 
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N-1  
Rs{i) = ^ (4.36) 
k=l  
The above solutions of state probabiUties are in exact but complex forms. An 
approximated form of Equation 4.36 along with the accuracy of the solution under 
the simplification assumption in a specified environment, is derived as follows. 
i'J(i) = Ac[l-Po(i)l + APi(()- (4.37) 
If 
XPi{t) < Ac[l -
neglecting 
foM = V[i-WI 
•s-Po(^) = ^c / s  - AcPo(^) 
-Po('®) — l/a-l/(s + Ac) 
and 
PqH) = 1 -
The approximated system reliability is 
Rs{t)z^l - PQ{t) = (4.38) 
Because of expensive development cost, in reality, it would be very undesir­
able to have a system of more than four software redundancies in parallel. When 
other common causes exist among a small subset of N modules, we have to re­
vise the above simplified model. A refinement for the full-version, unsimplified, 
N-component common cause model is evaluated in next subsection. 
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Figure 4.9: Configuration of N-component redundant system 
4.4.5 Generic N-component Markov model 
A system with N partially independent software components in parallel is shown 
in Figure 4.9. The unsimplified Markov model of this system with common-cause 
failure is shown in Figure 4.10 where the failure rates of each independent component 
are assumed to be the same. Let the state number of this Markov process be 
the number of components failed. Then, the differential equations of this Markov 
process can be expressed in terms of matrix. 
P ' { t )  =  AP{ t )  
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N-1 
X 
c 
Figure 4.10: Generic N-component Markov model 
The transient matrix A is 
(^00 0 0 0 0 
«01 ail 0 0 0 
"02 «12 022 0 0 
^O(n-l) ®l(n-l) ®2(n-l) '^(n-l)(n-l) °n(n-l) 
" O n  ® l n  ® 2 n  • • •  ° ( n — l ) n  
= (Sj) 
4.4.5.1 Construction of matrix A An element of matrix A repre­
sents the rate that the system moves from state i to state j. Let z be the system's 
jump size (z = j - i). 
Jump size (z) = 1 
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First of all, the element represents the rate that the system moves from 
state zero to state one. The system can move from state zero to state one only 
when a component out of n good components is failed due to an independent cause 
failure. Since all independent cause failures are mutually exclusive, the number of 
possible outcomes of this event is the same as that of choosing one component from 
n good components. In other words, the number of possible outcomes is that of 
choosing one out of n good components and none out of zero failed component. 
0 
7 1 —  
Therefore, the element becomes 
v i /  
^ 0 ^ 0 
E 
k=0  \  ^ /  
4 (4.39) 
Second, the element matrix A represents the rate that system moves 
from state one to state two. The system can move from state one to state two when 
a component out of (n-1) good components is failed due to the introduction of one 
of these two cases to the system. 
• case — One of (n-1) remained independent cause failures. The number 
of possible outcomes of this case consists of choosing one out of (n-1) good 
components and none out of one failed component. 
(n — 1)A]^ = 
/ 
\ 
n .  —  1  
1 
\ 
\ 0 /  
'1 
• ^2 case — One of (n-1) two-component common-cause failures. Here, the 
number of possible outcomes for two-component common-cause failure in-
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eluding the failed component is that of choosing one component out of (n-1) 
good components and one out of one failed component. 
(n - 1)A2 = 
\ 
^2 
The element 0^2 is derived by adding the above two cases together. 
(n - l){Xi + A2) — 
1 
E 
k=0  V ^ } 
(4.40) 
Third, the element 023 means the system moves from state two to state three. 
Since the system is in state two, there are two failed components and (n-2) good 
components. If one more component out of (n-2) good components fails, then, the 
system moves to state three. Three different types of failure rate (A^, A2, and A 3 )  
are involved in this case. 
• Aj case — A failure out of (n-2) remained independent failure. The number 
of possible outcomes consists of choosing one out of (n-2) good components 
and none out of two failed components. 
[n  — 2)Aj = n  — 2 
1 / 
/ „ \ 
v » /  
• A2 case — A failure out of two (n-2) two-component common-cause fail­
ures. This is because there are (n-2) possible combinations of two-component 
common-cause failure including one bad component. Since there are two bad 
components in the system, the total number of combination is 2(n-2). This 
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number consists of choosing one component out of (n-2) good components and 
another out of two failed components. 
/ 
2(n — 2)A2 = 
n  — 2 
1 V ^ y 
^2 
• A3 case — A failure out of (n-2) three-component common-cause failures. 
There are (n-2) possible outcomes of three-component common-cause failure 
that include two bad components. This is because one component from (n-2) 
good components and other two from two failed components. 
n - 2  
1 
/ 
(n  -  2)A3  =  
Therefore, the element ^23 becomes 
(n — 2)(A2 + 2A2 + A3) = 
\  / j N  
\ / V 2 /  
•^3 
fc=0 \  k  
^k+2  (4.41) 
At last, the element means the system moves from state (n-1) to state 
n. Since the system is in state (n-1), there are (n-1) failed components and one good 
component left. N different types of failure rates (A]^, A2, ..., A^) are involved in 
this element. 
• A^ case — A failure out of one good component. There is only one good 
component left. The number of possible outcomes consists of choosing one 
component out of one good component and none out of (n-1) failed compo­
nents. 
lAi = 
n  -  I  
0 
\ 
4 
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^2 case — A failure out of (n-1) two-component common-cause failure. Each 
two-component failure includes one remained good component and one of (n-
1) failed components. The number of possible outcomes consists of choosing 
one component from one good component and one component from (n-1) 
failed components. 
(n  -  1)A2  =  
( . \ 
\ ^ 
/ 
Tl — 1 
1 
^2 
A3 case — A failure out of (n-l)(n-2)/2 three-component common-cause fail­
ure. There are (n-l)(n-2)/2 three-component common-cause failures. Each of 
them includes one remained good component and any two out of (n-1) failed 
components. The number of combination becomes simply choosing one com­
ponent out of one good component and two components out of (n-1) failed 
components. 
( n -  l ) ( n - 2 )  
A 3  =  
\ V 
n — 1 
2 
A^_]^ case — A component can also fail when the system is introduced an 
(n-l)-component common-cause failure that includes a last good component. 
Each (n-l)-component failure has a good component and (n-2) failed compo­
nents. The number of outcomes of (n-l)-component common-cause failure is 
the same as the number of choosing one component from one good component 
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and (n-2) failed components from (n-1) failed components. 
( . \ 
\ ' j  
I  71  — 1 
Tl — 2 
\ 
^n-l 
• \n case — Since the system is in state (n-1), the only possible outcome of 
n-component common-cause failure is the one that includes all (n-1) failed 
components and a left good component. The number of this outcome consists 
of choosing one out of one good component and (n-1) out of (n-1) failed 
components. 
l A n  =  
/ i \  /  
v i /  
n — 1 
n — 1 
\ 
The element is derived by adding all cases together. 
Tl — 1 
0 
Ai + X2  +  
' n - l '  
Ag-t-.. .4" 
^ 1 \ "-1 / n - 1 ^ 
y 1 y k=0  
' n - l '  
71  — 2 
-^71-1 + 
n — 1 
(4.42) 
In general, when the system jumps only one step (z = j - i = 1), the element 
Uj^j of matrix A can be represented as follows: 
Hj  =  
\ 
n  — I  3 -2  
E 
k=0  
/ 
J - 2 
k  
2 = 1 (4.43) 
Jump size (z) — 2 
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The element aQ2, first, represents the rate that the system moves from state 
zero to state two. This can happen when a two-component common-cause failure 
fails two components in the system. There are n(n-l)/2 possible two-component 
common-cause failure combinations because any two components out of n good 
components are the candidates of this combination. The number of possible out­
comes becomes the number of choosing two components out of n good components 
and none out of zero failed component. 
n  (n  -  1) A2 = 
\ 
n  
\ 0 /  
A2 
Therefore, the element 0Q2 becomes 
A2 = 
fc = 0 \ K 
^k+2  (4.44) 
Second, for the element the system moves from state one to state three 
when two components out of (n-1) good components are failed. Since a component 
has been failed and (n-1) good components are available, there are two cases to be 
considered. 
• A2 case — Any two-component common-cause failure that do not consist the 
component already failed is a good candidate. The number of this outcomes 
consists of choosing two good components from (n-1) good components and 
none from one failed component. 
i  
{n  — l)(n. — 2)12X2  ~ 
n — 1 
\ ( 1 ^ 
A2 
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• Ag case — Any three-component common-cause failure that includes the com­
ponent already failed is a good candidate. The number of this outcomes con­
sists of choosing two good components from (n-1) good components and one 
component from one failed component. 
(n  — l)(n — 2)/2Ag = 
/ . \ 
\ 1 /  
/ 
n — 1 
2 
Therefore, the element becomes the sum of the above two cases. 
\ 
Ao -f ^3 = 
\ / 
1 
E 
k=0  k  / 
(4.45) 
Third, the element 024 represents the rate that the system moves from state 
two to state three. This could happen if any of these three kinds of failure introduced 
to the system. 
• A2 case — A failure out of (n-2)(n-3)/2 two-component common-cause fail­
ures. Since two components are already failed, the possible outcomes for 
two-component common-cause failure are any combination of two components 
from (n-2) good components and none from two failed components. 
(n — 2)(n — 3) A2 = 
Tl — 2 
2 / vV 
^2 
A 3  case — A failure out of (n-2)(n-3) three-component common-cause fail­
ures. The possible candidates for three-component common-cause failure are 
any combination of two components from (n-2) good components and one of 
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failed component. Since there are two components failed, the total number of 
candidates for three-component common-cause failure is two (n-2)(n-3)/2. 
71  — 2 
2 
/ 
(n — 2)(n — 3)Ag = 
\ / V1 
• A4 case — A failure out of (n-2)(n-3)/2 four-component common-cause fail­
ures. The possible candidates for four-component common-cause failure are 
any combination of two components from (n-2) good components and two 
from two failed components. 
I  (n - 2 ) { n  —  3) 
A/i — 
n - 2  
2 V 2 /  
The element 024 is derived by adding three cases together. 
Ao 
( n - 2 ^  
/ 
2A3-H 
71 — 2 
2 
\ 
A4 = 
^  n -  2^  2 
E 
k=0  
^ 2 ^ 
^k+2  
(4.46) 
In the same token, the elements 035, 045, ..., can be derived. 
Finally, for the element 2)n^ the types of failure rate involved in this element 
are from A2 to A^. Since there are already (n-2) failed components in the system, 
the system moves to state n if the remaining two good components fail. Therefore, 
every common-cause failure candidates should include these two good components. 
• A2 case — The number of possible outcomes consists of choosing two compo­
nents from two good components and none from (n-2) failed components. 
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• Ag case — The number of possible outcomes consists of choosing two compo­
nents from two good components and one from (n-2) failed components. 
/ \ 
V 2 /  
/ 
71 — 2 
1 
\ 
• case — The number of possible outcomes consists of choosing two com­
ponents from two good components and (n-3) from (n-2) failed components. 
/ \ 
V ^ / \ 
n - 2  
n — 3 
• An case — The number of possible outcomes consists of choosing two compo­
nents from two good components and (n-2) from (n-2) failed components. 
( _ \ 
n  — 2  
n  — 2  
\ 
^2  
The sum of these cases becomes 
^  n - 2 ^  ' n - 2 '  
/ 
Ag 4-... -I-
^  n  — [n  — 2 )  ^  
\ / 
71  — 2 
E 
k  
n  — 3 
/ 
/ n - 2 '  
n - 2  
m  
\ 
n  — 2 
k  
^k+2  (4.47) 
In general, when the system jumps two step (z = 2), the element ojj of matrix 
A can be expressed as follows: 
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/ . \ 
n  — I  
H j  =  
\ 
/  j - z  
/ 
E 
Â:=0 \ 
^k+z^  " 2  =  2  (4.48) 
Jump size (z) = 3 
The same procedure is applied to derive each element of matrix A when 
jump size becomes three. For the element agg, the number of outcomes for three-
component common-cause failure (A3) consists of choosing three components from 
n good components and none from zero failed component. 
/ \ 
n  
\ 3 /  \ ° /  
For the element 0^4) the number of outcomes for three-component common-cause 
failure (A3) and four-component common-cause failure (A4) consists of choosing 
three components from (n-1) good components. Here, outcome of four-component 
common-cause failure includes a failed component. 
/ 
n — 1 
3 / \ 0 /  
^3' 
/ V ^ ) 
A4 
For the element 025) there are three types of common-cause failure involved. 
The number of outcomes for three-component common-cause failure (A3) consists 
of choosing three components from (n-2) good components and none from two 
failed components. The number of outcomes for four-component common-cause 
failure (A4) consists of choosing three components from (n-2) good components and 
one component from two failed components. The number of outcomes for five-
component common-cause failure (Ag) consists of choosing three components from 
64 
(n-2) good components and choosing two components from two failed components. 
/ _ \ \ / 
71 — 2 
3 
•^3. 
72 — 2 
3 / V ^ / 
A4, 
Tl — 2 
3 
'  ' 2 ^  
\ 2 /  
In general, when the system jumps three steps (z = 3), the element a- of 
matrix A can be expressed as follows: 
/ . \ 
n  — I  
( ^ i j  = 
\ 
J - 2  
E 
fc=0 v k  
A z = 3 (4.49) 
Jump size (z) = n-1 
There are two elements belong to this jump size. For the element 
the number of outcomes for (n-l)-component common-cause failure (A^_]^) consists 
of choosing (n-1) components from n good components and none from zero failed 
component. 
/ 
nA n-1 = 
n  
n — 1 / 
^n-1 
For the element the number of outcomes for (n-l)-component common-
cause failure (A^_]^) consists of choosing (n-1) components from (n-1) good com­
ponents. The number of outcomes for n-component common-cause failure {Xn) 
consists of choosing (n-1) components from (n-1) good components and one com­
ponent from one failed component. 
n — 1 
/ 
(^n—1 ^Ti) 
I I  -  1 
n — 1 
\ 1 
E 
k=Q ^k+n—1 
65 
In general, when the system jumps (n-1) steps, the element aj^j of matrix A 
can be expressed as follows: 
/ . \ 
n  — I  
\ / 
3- z  
E 
k=0  k  
^ f c + 2 '  z  =  n  — I  (4.50) 
Jump size (z) = n 
For the element qq^, the system moves from state zero to state n only when 
n-component common-cause failure is introduced. The number of outcomes for n-
component common-cause failure {\ri) consists of choosing n components from n 
good components. 
IAtj, — 
I  \  
n  
\ / 
0 
E 
fc=0 
/ 
\ 
0 
^k+n  (4.51) 
Jump size (z) = 0 
All diagonal elements of matrix A belong to this jump size. According to the 
property of transient matrix, the sum of each element in the same column should be 
zero. Therefore, the rate of these element is the negative of the sum of corresponding 
column vector elements. 
n—i  
- E «i(/fc+i)' 
k=l  
(4.52) 
Jump size = negative 
Since the system is nonrepairable, there is no backward flow in the Markov 
process. All elements in the upper side of matrix A are zero. 
Hence, the general equations for the elements of matrix A are; 
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Hj  
I  •  \ n  — I  
~ ^k= l  
^k=0  
J - z 
k  
'/ . \ 
n  — I  
L\ 
^6=0 
^k+z  
I  .  \  ] -  z  
^fc + 2 
; 
0 
\ { i  <  3  
\ i i =  3  
otherwise 
(4.53) 
4.4.5.2 Numerical solution for system reliability In this study the 
system reliability of n components will be found by the use of numerical analysis. 
In order to find the numerical solution of the system reliability the numerical value 
of each component in matrix A should be calculated. In the middle of testing phase, 
the component failure rate can be estimated. Because the redundant components 
are not yet developed, the common-cause failure rates are unknown. Then, a careful 
estimation of parameters a, /3 based on historical data gives estimated common-
cause failure rates. The relationship between component failure rate and common-
cause failure rate are as follows: 
— oiA, 0 < a < 1 
A 2  = / 3 A 3  =  . . .  =  Z ? "  ^ A n  
and 
( 1  —  a ) A  —  A 2  " t "  A g  4 -  . . .  4 -  A 7 J .  
Eigenvalues are the diagonal elements of matrix A. 
•^0 = °00' = •••) -E'n = Ann = 0 
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For every complex n  x  n  matrix A there exists a nonsingular matrix P such 
that the matrix 
J  =  P - ^ A P  
is in the canonical form 
J = J l  0 
0 
J .  n  
where J is called Jordan canonical form and it is a diagonal matrix with diagonal 
element of matrix A, i.e., 
J = 
^0 
El  
E-n  
A set of corresponding eigenvectors is 
P  =  • • • P n )  (4.54) 
The eigenvectors lead to (n+1) sets of linear equations associated with a set of 
(n+1) equations in (n+1) unknowns. 
(Ejl - A)Pi = 0 i  =  0 , 1 , . . . ,  n  
where is an eigenvalue and I is the identity matrix. 
The values of each are the solution of Equation 4.54. Each vector Pj has 
(n+1) elements, Pj = [PjQ' -^zl' • • • ' leads (n+1) simultaneous equations. 
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Since all elements of upper side of matrix A equals to zero, all elements before 
element of vector become to zero. 
= 0 ,  i f  k  <  i  
Here, is the element of vector P^. 
The first element that is not zero is the element of vector Pj. All elements 
Pik {k > i) of vector Pj can be represented a function of element (Pjj). Once, 
the value of Pjj is arbitrary chosen, the value of rest P^j^ (A: > i) can be determined. 
By the inspection of Pjj values from simple cases, it is found that P^j = ( —1)""^ 
gives a simple matrix whose inverse matrix is the same. Therefore, let Pj^ be 
( — then, the value of rest elements of vector Pj can be calculated one by one. 
After the completion of P matrix, the inverse P~^ matrix needs to be found. 
With the initial conditions, 
( = [-Po(O), Pl(0),..., P n { 0 ) f  = [1,0 0]^ 
The probability of staying in each state can be calculated based on following equa­
tion. 
fbOO 
P l i t )  
Finally, the system reliability is 
Rs{ t )  = 1 — Pn{ i ) -
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4.5 Formulation of The Software Reliability Optimization 
To optimize the reliability of a software system, the reliability redundancy 
allocation approach is applied. A general formulation of this problem is 
Max  R3{X ,R)  
subject to 
Z j L  1 9 i j (>• j, X j )  <  h  for all i 
4.5,1 A pure software system 
A software is always accompanied with hardwares. However, when the relia­
bility of hardware component in the system is known, the system reliability can be 
optimized by including only software components. When only software components 
are involved in the optimization problem, the above problem can be transformed 
into the following form: 
Max  Rs{R i ,R] \ j ^ )  
subject to 
Eje5 < h for all i 
The objective function of the above formulation is represented in terms of the 
stage reliabilities that are, in turn, functions of both independent module reliabilities 
and of the number of redundant modules. The constraint function of the above 
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formulation is reliability-related cost function. The reliability-related cost function 
is 
f { r j , r j )  = Ci t r / ^ t  +  C2//r'A/i 
where, the formations of the extra debugging time (At) and that of the extra faults 
removed (A/x) to reach r* from r depend on the choice of the software reliability 
model. 
When the JM model is used, the formulations of the extra debugging time (At) 
and that of the extra faults removed (A^u) becomes; 
Af = 5] 
M ^ 
6 -1)] 
where 
When the NHPP model is used, the formulations of the extra debugging time 
(At) and that of the extra faults removed (A^u) becomes; 
= t* - t = ^[ln(— Inrj) - ln(— InrJ)] 
and 
A/i = n{ t* )  -  n{ t )  =  - Inrj] 
The redundancy-cost function, hij{xj), depends upon the type of constraints 
involved. A constant function, an increasing function, or a decreasing function can 
be used as needed and should be described in a generic form but in a form that 
reflects the software development life-cycle. 
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4.5.2 A hardware and software mixed system 
When both hardware and software components are not trivial, the reliability of 
both hardware and software components should be optimized with optimal number 
of redundancy. In a pure software system, each stage represents an independent 
functional module or subsystem. However, this model can be extended to optimize 
the reliability of a hardware and software system by adding the constraint function 
of hardware part. 
The objective function can be 
M a x  
The new constraints become 
The objective function of the above formulation is represented in terms of the 
stage reliabilities. Each stage can be a pure software component, a pure hardware 
component, or a hardware and software mixed component. The constraint function 
is represented as the product of a reliability-related cost function and a redundancy-
cost function. For hardware components, the reliability-related cost function is 
rj = exp[—AjS] 
-S 
In r j  
y 
f{ r j )  =  v j  
For software components, the reliability-related cost function is 
/(r^rp = CitrAt 4- C2)Ur A/i 
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where, the formations of the extra debugging time (At) and that of the extra 
faults removed (A/^) to reach r* from r again depend on the choice of the software 
reliability model. 
When the JM model is used, the formulations of the extra debugging time (At) 
and that of the extra faults removed (A/i) becomes; 
M 1 
Ai -1)] 
where 
M = JV + 
When the NHPP model is used, the formulations of the extra debugging time 
(At) and that of the extra faults removed (A/x) becomes; 
At = t* — t  = — [ln( — In Tj ) - ln( — In rj)] 
and 
A/i = /i(i*) - n{i) = - Inrjj 
The redundancy-cost function, /i^j(xj), depends upon the type of constraints 
involved. A constant function, an increasing function, or a decreasing function can 
be used as needed and should be described in a generic form but in a form that 
reflects the software development life-cycle. 
4.5.3 The type of resources 
The types of resources are: 
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• manpower 
• computer usage 
• project duration required (development time) 
• reliability 
• memory size 
• others 
The reliability cost functions related with those resources can be formulated as 
follows: 
1. Manpower and computer time (total cost) 
f l j  =  R C { r , r * )  =  C i t r ^ t  - f  A / /  <  b - ^  
2 .  Project duration required 
f l j  =  t r  A t  <  64 
where (r^t is the failure-identification time. It is assumed that the failure-
correction time is small enough to be ignored. 
3. Memory space 
f i j  =  M  <  65 
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4.5.4 Other problem formulation 
When the development cost is the major concern and the performance require­
ment is the system minimum reliability, a general formulation of this problem is 
min (4-35) 
jes 
where rj is the projected component reliability. The main constraint could be 
Rs{X,R) > Rs^req. The decision variables that need to be calculated are X and 
R 
4.5.5 Redundancy cost function 
hij[xj) = k • xj (4.56) 
The cost of increasing a redundant component is usually less than 1.5 times of 
the original unit development cost; this is because redundancy components shared 
• the cost of specification, 
• some of the design cost, 
• most of testing cost, and 
• most of the documentation cost 
together with the original component. 
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4.6 Optimal Reliability and Redundancy Allocation Algorithm 
In most reliability optimization problems, the decision variables are the number 
of redundancies that are integers (integer programming or redundancy allocation 
problems), the component reliabilities that are real numbers (real programming 
or reliability allocation problems), or a combination of both (mixed-integer pro­
gramming or reliability-redundancy allocation problems). In the methods that are 
based on differentiation, the decision variables must be continuous. Earlier stud­
ies treat the number of redundancies as real variables. The real number answer is 
rounded off and the neighboring integer solutions are evaluated. The best feasible 
solution among the trials is taken as the final solution. This method works well 
if the problem is simple and the constraints are linear [46]. As the problem gets 
complicated, however, the rounding off and trial-and-error procedure become inef­
ficient and inaccurate. In addition, this approach provides no theoretical reasoning 
and has difficulties in extending the integer programming problem to the mixed-
integer programming problem. Such an extension is frequently needed for reliability 
optimization. Furthermore, computation on the trial-and-error basis cannot be ef­
ficiently automated. 
A method combining the Lagrange multiplier technique with the branch-and-
bound technique is proposed by Kuo et al. [40]. The Lagrange multiplier technique 
quickly reaches an exact real number solution that is close to the optimal solu­
tion. Next, the branch-and-bound method is used to obtain the integer solution. 
This proposed method can solve both the redundancy allocation problem and the 
reliability-redundancy allocation problem. When dealing with the latter problem, 
only branching and bounding the integer variable is necessary. 
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4.6.1 Lagrange multiplier and Kuhn-Tucker conditions 
The Lagrange multiplier technique transforms the given constrained optimiza­
tion problem into the unconstrained problem by introducing the Lagrange multipli­
ers, Aj's. The unconstrained optimization problem, called the Lagrangian, becomes 
M 
Max L { X , R ,A)  =  R s { X , R ) -  ^ (4.57) 
Z = 1 
A'.s > 0. 
The necessary conditions for a maximum to exist form a system of simultaneous 
equations. The solutions to these simultaneous equations are extreme points in the 
constraints of the problem. The nonlinear simultaneous equations can be solved 
by any mathematical algorithm, such as Newton's method, which expresses the 
multi-variable root-finding problem. Subroutines for solving nonhnear simultane­
ous equations are available in many mathematical libraries. Examples are ZSCNT 
and ZSPOW of IMSL [33], and ZONE of PORT mathematical library [53j. These 
subroutines are accurate, convenient, and efficient. However, they may not con­
verge, and no feasible solution exist. 
4.6.2 The branch-and-bound technique in integer programming 
The branch-and-bound technique of integer programming for reliability opti­
mization is stated in the paper by Garfinkel and Nemhauser [22]. In step 2 among 
those steps described in that paper, there are many criteria for selecting the variable 
for  b ranch ing  [27] .  Th is  s tudy  se lec t s  the  var iab le  Xj  tha t  min imizes  min{x* ,  l  — x*)  
over index i. 
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4.6.3 Randomized Hooke and Jeeves method 
The Hooke and Jeeves method requires only objective function evaluations and 
does not use partial derivatives. The Hooke and Jeeves method uses the iterative 
technique. This method is easy to apply for use on digital computers, since the tech­
nique repeats its typical iterative moves: exploratory and pattern. The algorithm 
can quickly detect and follow a steep valley of a multi-variable function because the 
information accumulated in previous iterations may be used to find the most prof­
itable search directions. For this reason, the method is a well-known direct search 
method for unconstrained minimization problems. 
However, the Hooke and Jeeves method has some difficulties when it is applied 
to constrained problems. We may expect the method fails to improve the objective 
function at the boundary, sharp corners, shallow regions, or ridges. 
Although the Hooke and Jeeves method can get the optimal solution in un­
constrained minimization problems, slow convergence close to the optimum may be 
expected. As mentioned before, the Hooke and Jeeves method has some difficulties 
due to its moving in only one direction at a time when constrained minimization 
problems are considered. Some methods which modify the Hooke and Jeeves method 
are proposed. One way to solve these difficulties is to consider random move in n-
dimensions instead of one direction at a time when the search is frozen in a certain 
region. 
The simplest concept of random searching inside the n-dimensional hypercube 
is applied to exploratory move of the Hooke and Jeeves method. Since this method 
is unbiased in choosing the next moving point, it may be useful to find the location 
of a global minimum when the objective function has multiple minima. In addition, 
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it may solve the local difficulties of the deterministic methods (Hooke and Jeeves 
method). 
4.6.4 Combination of the randomized H-J method and the branch-and-
bound technique 
Branching and bounding only the redundancy variables are necessary and suf­
ficient. The above steps can be directly applied to the mixed-integer programming 
problem. For a mixed-integer programming problem, only the integer variables need 
to be enumerated by the branch-and-bound procedure. The real variables are free 
of restriction after each step of the branch-and-bound technique. Then by using the 
randomized Hooke and Jeeves method, their new optimal values are obtained. The 
branch-and-bound process is stopped whenever all the integer variables find integer 
values. Multiple near optimal solutions may be achieved to provide management 
with several options and flexibility. 
4.7 Examples 
4.7.1 A pure software system 
To illustrate the procedure of optimal allocation of software reliability and 
redundancy, a two-stage series software system without a hardware component is 
employed. A brief description of procedure follows. At the end of the specification 
phase, the parameters can be estimated by the use of any of the complexity models. 
A solution derived from this optimization suggests a general direction for system 
design to management. 
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In the early state of the test phase, more accurate data can be collected as 
times between failures. The form of data should be based on the reliability model 
chosen in the design phase. The estimation of model parameters can be obtained 
on the basis of the real data collected. Next, an optimization problem can be set 
up, depending on the goal of the decision-making process. 
A formulation of the optimization problem considered is 
max Rs  = /(A,i) (4.58) 
subject to 
{Citrài. t j  + C2/irA/ij}  • kxj  < (4.59) 
The parameters, cost coefficient and other data needed to solve this optimiza­
tion problem are given in Table 4.1. Further assume that 
= aX , 0 < a < 1 , 
•^2 = = ... = 
and 
(1 — a) A = ^2 4- A g 4- ... 4- A jy. 
With the data given in Table 4.1, the problem was solved by the randomized 
H-J method and the branch-and-bound method [40]. The optimal solution, shown 
in Table 4.2, was obtained. After 20 simulation runs with different starting points 
and random number seeds, the optimal solution of system reliability ranges from 
Rs = 0.805 to Rs = 0.825 with the total cost ranging from $73,100 to $74,800. The 
optimal solution also indicates that stage 1 needs two components to optimize the 
system. The results of this optimization should serve as important input for the 
decision-making process. 
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Table 4.1: Data for a numerical example 
stage 1 stage 2 
$ 0.00685 0.00164 
N 32.2 42 
a,(3 0.95, 0.20 
1, 0.1 
Cl'Cg 42, 40 
h 75,000 
k k=0.4 for redundancies 
s 20 
The final step is to allocate or reallocate the residual resources on the basis 
of resources required for each stage. Since the failure rate of each component is 
different, the time required to reach the projected failure rate or the reliability of 
each component is different. By using Equations 4.6 and 4.7 or Equations 4.13 
and 4.16, the resources required to reach the projected component reliability can 
be calibrated. In this example, stage one needs 26,427 units and stage two needs 
48,207 units of resources. Management should realize that assigning an accurate 
amount of resources (e.g., number of personnel) to each stage at the beginning can 
eventually save development cost, time, and efforts. 
4.7.2 A hardware and software mixed system 
The system in this example has two components in series. The first compo­
nent (stage A) can not have any redundant component and the cost of developing 
hardware component is trivial. The reliability and development cost of hardware 
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Table 4.2: Optimal solution 
stage 1 stage 2 
2 1 
A,: 0.00685 0.00984 
cost $26,427 $48,207 
total cost $74,634 
Rs 0.81 
component of stage A is known. The second component (stage B) can have re­
dundant components. Each hardware component in stage B has a corresponding 
software. The reliability and developing cost of hardware component of stage B are 
also known. Softwares of both stages A and B have not yet been developed. The 
failures of stage A and stage B are independent. However, there are common-cause 
failure among software redundancies of stage B. 
For the purposes of this study each component in the system is said to have 
failed if the output from corresponding component is not the same as it designed. 
The reliabilities and development costs for both hardware components are given 
in Table 4.3. The model used in this example is NHPP model. The procedure of 
optimizing the system is the same as the pure software system example discussed 
in the previous section. 
In the early state of the test phase, more accurate data can be collected as times 
between failures. The estimation of NHPP model parameters can be obtained on 
the basis of the real data collected and are given in the Table 4.4. Here, the resource 
usage parameters tr and /Xr are unit because the time used in this model assumed 
to be an actual calendar time. 
82 
Table 4.3: Component reliabilities and development costs 
900-hr 
reliability cost 
H/W comp. in stage A 0.985 2380 
H/W comp. in stage B 0.980 3400 
Next, an optimization problem can be set up, depending on the goal of the 
decision-making process. A formulation of the optimization problem considered is 
max R s  =  f { R , x )  (4.60) 
subject to 
{Citrùktj -f ' kxj < bi (4.61) 
With the data given in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, the problem was solved by the 
randomized Hooke and Jeeves method and the branch-and-bound method. The 
optimal solution, shown in Table 4.5, was obtained. The optimal solution indicates 
that stage B needs two components to optimize the system and enhances the system 
reliability up to 0.9814 from 0.9639. The results of this optimization should serve 
as an important input for the decision-making process. 
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Table 4.4: Data for a mixed system example 
stage A stage B 
a,b 0.0093, 138.37 0.023, 64 
a,(3 0.985, 0.120 
1, 1 
Ci.Cg 48, 40 
h 100,000 
k k=0.3 for redundancies 
s 900 
Table 4.5: Optimal solution 
1 stage 1 stage 2 
2% 1 2 
Ri 0.9970 0.9965 
cost 61,000 30,000 
total cost 100,000 
Rs 0.9814 
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5 SOFTWARE QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
Software technology has been criticized by dissatisfied users for its poor quality, 
cost overruns, and late delivery. It has been recognized that the modern software 
development methodologies, such as structured programming, structured analysis, 
structured design technique, and others, can hardly solve these problems. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to suggest protocols to handle these problems of software 
development by applying statistical quality control to every phase of the testing 
cycle. Today, management in the software industry knows that despite the most 
painful efforts to control product quahty, variation in product quality is unavoid­
able. Through the use of process control techniques, such as statistical control 
charts, unusual variations in the software development process can be controlled 
and reduced. 
Finding faults after the failure occurrence can at least prevent software with 
low reliability from plaguing users, but this is not what statistical software qual­
ity control is all about. The statistical software quality control affects not only 
the end product but also its process. It involves new practices, dealing with new 
personnel, learning new forms of communications, and providing a new concept of 
development. To develop high-quality software efficiently, the statistical software 
quality control procedure must be planned, with each specified step related to a 
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development activity. 
The software testing process is not exhaustive but instead is more represen­
tative of a sampling process. If our testing process only observes portions of the 
entire population and removes only the discovered faults among the latent faults, 
the software testing process is fundamentally the same as the statistical sampling 
process of manufacturing. 
By use of Cho's SIAD (Symbolic Input Attribute Decomposition) [12] random 
test input for statistical quality control can be obtained. Cho defines SIAD as a 
tree element, representing the input domain of a software entity arranged in a linear 
list with the structure preserved by a set of tree symbols for random sampling. 
The SIAD tree represents the input domain of a piece of software in a form that 
facilitates construction of random test input units for producing random product 
units for quality inspections. Four types of SIAD trees have been developed: regular, 
weighted, ruled, and network. 
It is the intention of this study to provide a guideline or a standard procedure for 
using statistical quality control, to find the outcomes of variation, and to identify 
their causes in software development. The proposed process of software quality 
control may not be very radical but more a formalization of quality control practices 
on the software development and recording of them in a way that allows developers 
to know what they are doing and why they are doing it. 
The proposed process of software quality control is depicted in Figure 5.1 and 
steps involved with software quality control are; - • 
• Description of software quality variation outcome 
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• Data collection design 
• Data charting design 
• Concurrent data collection and charting 
• Variation analysis (Interpretation) 
• Cause identification 
• Cause elimination 
5.1 Review on S IAD Trees and Input Domain Reliability Model 
5.1.1 S IAD tree 
Up to 50 percent of the requirements for software development never get ad­
dressed in a proper manner in the industry. Specifically, in current software devel­
opment practice, test requirements are missing from the requirements specification. 
Software engineering (development) requirements, software requirements, test re­
quirements, and documentation requirements are four parts of necessary specifica­
tion requirements. 
After identifying the software engineering goals and principles, the detailed 
input, output, and processing requirements should be specified. These require­
ments are equivalent to raw materials, industrial processing, and product design 
requirement in the manufacturing industries. One of the way to identify the input 
requirements is using a convenient form called the SIAD (Symbolic Input Attribute 
Decomposition) tree for software design and test design. 
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Figure 5.1; Software quality control process 
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The statistical quality control begins by taking random sampling from input 
domain which has been specified by the SIAD tree. Four types of SIAD trees have 
been developed by Cho so far: regular, weighted, ruled, and network. 
5.1.1.1 Regular SIAD tree Figure 5.2 shows an example structure. The 
symbols A, B, ..., U are called the tree elements. A tree symbol in Table 5.1 shows 
the relationship of an element to other elements. A tree so arranged is a regular 
SIAD tree, as each element is index column. An SIAD tree is used a tool for 
describing the input domain of a piece of software and as a basis for construction 
of test input units using random sampling, which makes it possible to apply the 
principle of statistical quality control. 
A set of random numbers between 1 and N is produced using a random number 
generator. The element with its index equal to the random number is selected. Say, 
two elements are to be taken from the tree using the random numbers 3 and 8. The 
elements D and L are drawn for constructing the test input unit. An element is 
tested with all other relevant elements by way of tree symbols. Table 5.2 shows the 
list of relevant elements with each sampled element. This listing gives a meaningful 
description of each sampled element for guiding test input unit design. 
5.1.1.2 Weighted SIAD tree A weighted SIAD tree is identical to a reg­
ular SIAD tree, except that each tree element in the weighted SIAD tree is indexed 
with selected weights or multiple indices. Table 5.3 shows an example of a weighted 
SIAD tree modified from the regular SIAD tree shown in Table 5.1. With the control 
of weights, different tree elements can have different probabilities of being sampled 
for test input unit construction. 
89 
Figure 5.2: A tree structure 
Table 5.1: A regular SIAD tree 
Index Tree Symbol Tree Element 
1 A 
2 
-^1,1 B 
3 D 
4 ^1,1,2 E 
5 ^1,2 C 
6 ^^1,2,1 F 
7 
-^1,2,2 G (numerical) 
8 
-^1,2,2,1 L (lower bound) 
9 ^1,2,2,2 U (upper bound) 
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Table 5.2: Test element 
Index Tree Symbol Tree Element 
1 A 
2 B 
3 
-^1,1,1 D 
1 A 
5 
^1,2 C 
7 
-^1,2,2 G 
8 
'^1,2,2,1 L 
Table 5.3: A weighted SI AD tree 
Weight Index Tree Symbol Tree Element 
2 1-2 A 
4 3-6 
-^1,1 B 
8 7-14 
-^1,1,1 D 
6 15-20 
-^1,1,2 E 
10 21-30 
-^1,2 C 
2 31-32 ^1,2,1 F 
5 33-37 
-^1,2,2 G (numerical) 
12 38-49 
'^1,2,2,1 L (lower bound) 
2 50-52 
'^1,2,2,2 U(upper bound) 
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5.1.1.3 Ruled S IAD tree A ruled SIAD tree is similar to a regular SIAD 
tree, except that rules for using the inputs are incorporated into the tree. The 
rule index and subindex columns are added to regular SIAD tree. These rule index 
columns specify the general restriction of each tree element. 
5.1.1.4 Network SIAD tree The network SIAD tree can be used for ap­
plications in which the regular, weighted, and ruled SIAD trees cannot conveniently 
represent the software input domain. Such applications include operating system, 
communication networks, and compilers. Using the network SIAD tree, test input 
units can be constructed systematically for testing the syntax entity by generating 
a random number of elements. 
5.1.2 Input domain reliability model 
5.1.2.1 Nelson model Nelson [51] has derived a statistical basis for soft­
ware reliability assessment based on error correlation with program structure. Data 
sets are used to execute the program structure. Each specific input data set pro­
ceeds through a sequence of segments, with a branch to a new segment taking place 
at exit of each segment. The sequence of segments in the execution of the program 
is called a logic path of the program. 
For each input data set, the program specifies a computational process by 
means of which a computer program can computer the function value which the 
computable function assigns to that input data set. Assuming that inputs are se­
lected independently according to some probability distribution function, the func­
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tion becomes 
R { i )  =  [i?(i)r = {RY (5.1) 
where R  =  -R(l). The reliability R  can be defined as follows: 
i? = 1 — lim —— (o.2) 
n^oo n 
where n is the number of runs and my is number of failures in n runs. This is the 
operational definition of software reliability of one run. 
In the operational phase, if errors are not removed when failures occur, the 
probability of experiencing k failures out of M randomly selected runs follows a 
binomial distribution. 
Pk = 
( \ 
[ 1 -  R { l ) f y R { l ) y ^ ^ - ' ' .  (5.3) 
\ ^ / 
During the testing phase, a sequence of M tests are selected randomly from the 
input space without repeating the same test. Then the probability of k failures out 
of M runs follows a hypergeometric distribution. 
If a sequence of k runs are not selected randomly from the operational profile, 
R(l) may be different for each run. The maximum likelihood estimate of R(l) can 
be obtained by running some test cases. It can be expressed as 
^(1) = 1 ^ (3-4) 
where Fi is the number of test cases that cause failure and Nf is the number of 
test cases. Since the number of elements in the input space is a very large number, 
the number of test cases has to be large in order to have a high confidence in 
estimation. To simplify the estimation of R(l), Nelson modifies the above basic 
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model by assuming that the input space is partitioned into m sets. As test cases 
are selected from each partition and all the errors from the test cases are removed, 
the reliability of one run can be formulated as 
-R(l) = -/i) (5.5) 
i  
where is the probability that an input is from partition i and is the probability 
that an input from partition i will cause failure. The values of /j's are given by 
Nelson for a quick estimation of the software reliability. 
5.1.2.2 Input domain based Stochastic model The input domain based 
Stochastic model proposed by Ramamoorthy and Bastani [54] starts from the as­
sumption of reliability growth models. Inputs are selected randomly and indepen­
dently from the input domain according to the operational distribution. This is a 
very strong assumption and will not hold in general. The relaxed assumption for 
general growth model is that input are selected randomly and independently from 
the input domain according to some probability distribution (which can be change 
with time). 
This means that the effective error size varies with time even though the pro­
gram is not changed. This permits a modeling of the testing process. Unlike the 
failure rate model which keeps track of the failure rate at failure times, this model 
keeps track of the reliability of each run given a certain number of failures have 
occurred. 
Let 
j number of failures experienced 
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k number of runs since the failure 
T j { k )  testing process for the run 
Vj(k) size of residual errors for the run 
X j  error size under operational inputs 
f(Ty(k)) severity of testing process 
Then 
i=l 
(5.6) 
In the above equation, let 
f { T j { k ) )  =  1. 
The testing process is assumed to be identical to the operational environment. Then, 
=  ^ j - 1  -  ^j -
Intuitively, errors which are caught later have a smaller size than those which are 
caught earher. However, this is true only in a probabihstic sense. This can be 
modelled by requiring that 
4 -
Therefore, 
R A k )  = £[(1 - A,)«^ 
k 
\ ' / 
k f 
E 
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5.2 Software Quality Control Process 
5.2.1 Description of software quality variation outcomes 
The goal of software quality control is to control and, eventually, reduce the 
unusual variation in the software development process. The first step in the software 
quality control process is to describe the software quality variation outcomes. The 
software quality variation outcomes are direct indications of abnormalities observed 
in statistical control charts. These outcomes of variation should be distinguished 
from the causes of variation. These outcomes are the possible consequences of causes 
rather than causes themselves. It is very important to enumerate and specify all 
outcomes of variation before the data collection design phase. Without a specific 
purpose in mind or a complete understanding of how the data are to be used, 
data collection and data analysis are not meaningful. A complete understanding 
of the outcomes of variation allows more effective use of statistical quality control 
techniques and makes the elimination of variation easier. 
A list of possible outcomes of variation of software development is subjective. 
The following all outcomes of variation may not be applied to all software, nor be 
complete in the sense of representing all software projects. A historical record of 
quality control analysis on quality variations and a careful analysis on the quality 
control charts of software under development help managers to investigate more 
outcomes of variation. Suggestions on the study of outcomes of variation follow: 
• More-than-error-prone module: Each module has a different structure, a dif­
ferent algorithm, a unique function to perform, and it is developed by a dif­
ferent group of people. Therefore, each software module has a different size 
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and distribution of errors. As module testing goes on, some modules never 
get better; testing creates as many new faults as it debugs. It is desirable to 
identify software modules that are behaving in significantly different ways. 
More-than-error-prone personnel: Since each module has a different func­
tion to perform and each software developer has a different educational back­
ground, a certain type of module may not be suitable for a certain developer. 
It is necessary to know who tends to create more errors than others in which 
type of module. Manager may want to assign that personnel to other type of 
module. 
Near out of control system: When 1) any serious logic error occurs in the pro­
gram structure, 2) the software does not fit the system's external specification, 
or 3) the system's initial objectives are misinterpreted, a few adjustments to 
the software system will not satisfy the user's requirements. Management's 
attention is required. 
Slow response: A software system may response more slowly than expected 
to a certain type or amount of input data. Slow response may require the 
whole module or system to be rewritten with a new algorithm or a different 
software language. This phenomenon can happen in any testing stage. 
Unusually low failure rate: Gardiner and Montgomery [21] pointed out that 
an unusually low failure rate could be a potentially troublesome situation. 
This is also a sign of system variation. It is the indication of either better 
quality or application of an ineffective or insufficient testing method. Again, 
management's attention is required. 
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• Unusually long bug-elimination time: Examination and study of statistical 
data on fault elimination time should be conducted. Some faults may be easy 
to detect but not necessarily easy to collect them. Some faults may behave 
the other way. It might be useful to find the correlation between the number 
of bugs eliminated and the time spent to eliminate them. These statistic helps 
the supervisor not only to find unusual variations in the bug-elimination phase 
but also to predict the total elimination time required for the given initial 
number of bugs. 
• others 
5.2.2 Data collection design 
Once the software quality variation outcomes are specified, a quality-related 
data collection should be planned on the basis of each quality variation outcome be­
cause a small or moderate amount of intelligently collected data is worth more than 
a ton of less intelligently collected data. The purpose, methods, and tools of test­
ing change throughout the various phases of the software development. The range 
of techniques in testing is also extremely broad starting from a syntax-checking 
within the compiler to design review where the specifications and requirements are 
tested. The sequence (stage) of testing progress is also numerous. First of all, each 
software module is independently tested in module testing stage. Syntax-checking, 
comprehensive checking, various stress points checking, and extremes of the range 
of variables checking are the variety of module testing. Next, the program structure 
and the interfaces among these modules are checked in integration testing stage. 
Next, the complete software system of which modules are interconnected is 
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tested under the simulated user environment in the system testing stage. At last, 
the acceptance test is conducted to check the requirement of software system. In 
this stage, the developer wants to demonstrate the absence of error, in other words, 
to convince the purchaser that how good the software is. Meanwhile, the user wants 
to see the presence of error (i.e., how bug-free software is under the unusual cases). 
The design of data collection should be done based on each quality variation 
outcome of interest, not based on the stage of testing or the methods of testing 
because the outcomes of quality variation are the facts that the development team 
wants to detect. The design of data collection could be unique for each quality 
variation outcome of interest. On the basis of the quality variance outcome, the 
following questions should be answered. Some of the questions that need to be 
investigated are: 
• which data should be gathered 
• how data should be collected 
• who should gather data 
• when data should be collected 
• how much data should be collected 
5.2.2.1 Which data should be collected The type of data collected 
depends on the goal of software quaHty control (e.g., the outcomes of variation). 
The followings are some examples of data types based on its outcomes of variation. 
1. More-than-error-prone module 
If one of the goals is to detect more-than-error-prone module, it is rational to 
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collect failure rate (e.g., number of faults detected per 100 program lines) per 
quality measure for all modules. Here, the quality measure is the number of 
test cases executed. 
When data are collected based on time-domain model, the quality measure 
becomes the execution time for debugging. 
2. More-than-error-prone personnel 
Failure rate (e.g., number of faults discovered per 100 lines) per quality mea­
sure (the number of test cases executed) is collected for all development per­
sonnel. 
3. Near out of control state system 
Failure rate (e.g., number of faults discovered per 1000 lines) per quality 
measure is also collected starting from the integration testing stage. Here, 
the quality measure could be number of test cases executed, calendar time, or 
execution time. 
4. Slow response 
Response rate (e.g., response time per 1000 line) per volume of data for all 
modules or system is collected. 
5. Unusually low failure rate 
All data types described above are considered as data for the detection of 
unusually low failure rate outcome. 
6. Unusually long bug-elimination time 
Fault collection time of each fault can be a good candidate for the analysis of 
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variation in bug-elimination process. 
5.2.2.2 How data should be collected Data should be collected in a 
format that makes it immediately useful and easy to analyze. Data should be 
gathered on carefully designed check sheets so that the collected data doesn't need 
to be transferred to another form. 
5.2.2.3 Who should gather data Data should be collected those indi­
viduals most familiar with the process of interest. They should be properly trained 
in data collection techniques and provided with adequate time and resources. Fail­
ure identification personnel and failure correction personnel belong to this category. 
These personnel should be well trained to avoid any misrepresenting data. 
5.2.2.4 When data should be collected 
• specification phase 
• design phase 
• testing phase 
- module testing 
- integration testing 
- system testing 
- acceptance testing 
Table 5.4 illustrates the relationship between testing stage and the outcomes of 
variance. The outcomes of variance should be observed under the corresponding 
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testing phase (the one which has the check point). For example, it is better to find 
more-than-error-prone module in module testing phase. Finding more-than-error-
prone module after module test is not desirable. 
5.2.2.5 How much data should be collected What is the optimal sam­
pling size? How much data should be corrected? These questions have been a big 
issue in statistical quality control. In software development, data collection basi­
cally lasts the end of software life. However, the size of data and the amount of data 
collected depends on the goals and objectives of the study, the degree of precision 
designed, and available resources. The optimal size and amount of sampling which 
can achieve the best results in statistical software quality control should be further 
investigated. Moreover, when an error is discovered and corrected, the software is 
actually changed. Because of the imperfect debugging, the software may be intro­
duced new errors. In the case like this the issue, here, is whether all previous test 
case should be repeated or not. Further investigation is also required. 
5.2.3 Data charting design 
In the previous software quality variation description phase, the list of possible 
outcomes of variation are not completed. Since these outcomes of variation in 
software development are subjective, hunting down other outcomes of variation 
subject to current software is an inevitable step. 
Charting data into various statistical quality control charts helps developers 
not only 
1. to get statistical evidence of variation, but also 
Table 5.4: Outcomes vs. I*liases 
more than more than near out of slow unusual unusual long 
error prone error prone control response low elimination 
module personnel state system failure rate time 
module test y y v/ y y 
integration test V y y y y . 
system test y /^ y y 
acceptance test y 
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2. to find more outcomes of variation. 
First of all, simple histograms, time plots, and other scatter plots so called 
preliminary control charts are invaluable tools to hunt down outcomes of variation 
and to eliminate causes of variation. Moreover, these plots give early signal of 
variation and check the correlation of variables under study. 
1. histogram: 
Making specifications on a histogram is a very effective way of communicating 
to development personnel and fault-discovery personnel what needs to be done 
to improve the performance of software development. Eventually, histogram 
gives a new idea to eliminate the source of variation to improve the system. 
Ex) Pareto diagram: focuses attention on biggest problems first. 
2. time plot; 
Constructing a simple time plots before constructing statistically controlled 
charts might hint at the reliability of system. The scatter represents more 
unreliability as more time goes. 
3. scatter plot: 
Scatter plot is the simplest way to study correlation between two variables. 
The type of data collected for each outcome of variation was already discussed. 
Correlation of two variables (failure rate vs. the number of test batch) should 
be checked to construct the statistical quality control chart. 
Then, ignoring the number of test cases executed, divide the data into con­
venient subgroups and plot a standard control chart for failure rate. In other 
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words, the data of failure rate should be re-examined by changing the sample 
size. 
Second, the statistically controlled regression control chart should be con­
structed and analyzed to find the evidence of unusual variation and control the 
software process. The failure rate (number of fault discovered per a group of lines) 
collected as the testing continues can not be a linear function of the number of test 
units executed over the entire range of testing phases (see Fig. 5.3). In this study 
for simplicity the correlation of these two variables is assumed to be exponentially 
distributed. As the testing continues, the number of faults discovered tend to de­
crease. A collection of failure rate points during software testing phase shows the 
possibility that something other than the standard Shewhart control chart might 
be desirable. Therefore, the only reasonable choice among the statistical control 
charts in this case is the regression control chart. 
For instance, after a glance at simple histogram or time plots, a suspicion of 
the existence of variation were found in some modules. Software development team 
wants to find stronger evidences on the existence of more-than-error-prone module 
(if there is any) during module testing. The constructed regression control chart is 
more carefully examined, especially for those of modules which showed a suspicion 
of the existence of unusual variation. 
Assuming linearity (after the transformation of variables), the line which best 
fits trended data, such as those in Fig. 5.4, may be found by the statistical technique 
of least squares. This is nothing more than a device for fitting m and b in the straight 
line equation, y = mx + b. With sets of ordinate values (y's) and abscissa values 
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(x's), m and b may be found from 
n { E x y ) - { E x ) { E y )  ,  .  
,  . ( Z z ) ( Z z 2 / ) - ( Z ï / ) ( E z 2 )  
E » ) 2 - n ( E « 2 )  
where n = the number of pairs oî  x ,  y  values. 
Here, x becomes the logarithm of failure rates (i.e., the number of faults dis­
covered / a group of line / the number of test cases executed) and y becomes either 
the logarithm of time periods or that of batches number of testing units. With the 
equation of the straight line established, the standard error of estimate (cr) is found 
to use in calculating control limits. 
^ ^  (l/n)E[(a; -a!)(y-y)] 
(TxCTy 
cr = cry\J\ - (5.10) 
The only remaining task to complete the control chart in Fig. 5.4 is to decide 
how to put control limits around a line of regression. The decision is closely related 
to the cost of system (or module) rejection. No solution necessarily universally 
correct. However, a general rule could be that module testing phase has more tight 
control limits than integration and system testing phase do. 
Perhaps, 2cr or 3cr control limits with tight warning limits may be suitable 
for module test. Meanwhile, 3(T or 4cr control limits with loose warning limits are 
justified for integration and system testing phases. Basically, these judgement can 
be made based on historical records or the expectation of quality of underdeveloping 
software system. 
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J I J L 
1 2  3  4 5 6  7 8 9  1 0  
x' = NUMBER OF TEST CASES EXECUTED 
Figure 5.3: Regression line 
3ct CONTROL LIMIT 
X = log X' 
Figure 5.4: Transformed regression line 
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5.2.4 Concurrent data collection and charting 
It should be pointed out that the goal of software quality control is not only 
to find and locate these software faults, but also to find and reduce the sources of 
these variation's outcomes. So that, the quality of both underdeveloping software 
and future software can be improved. Supervisor keeps in mind that variation in 
a measurement comes from many sources and should working together with fault-
correction personnel and fault-discovery personnel to find better way of detecting 
any quality unusual variation. 
5.2.5 Variation analysis 
A simple point that strayed beyond preset boundaries (limits) is interpreted as 
an action signal. In other words, the point beyond boundaries is an evidence that 
something is wrong. 
5.2.6 Cause identification 
No matter how carefully specified, designed, and developed software is, the 
natural variation (sometimes called background noise or chance causes) will present. 
The natural variation is the result of "nonassignable" causes. The causes that can 
be identified or assigned is called assignable causes. The assignable causes can 
create the unnatural variation. A process that is operating with only nonassignable 
causes of variation present is said to be in statistical control. 
The final objective of this chapter is to detect and remove these assignable 
causes not nonassignable cause. These unnatural variations may be divided into 
two types: 
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1. relatively simple: due to a single assignable cause 
2. relatively complex: combination of more than two assignable causes 
In the former case the cause of variation can usually be found without signif­
icant effort. In the latter case major variation should be traced by stratifying or 
segmenting a data set along the lines of possible sources of variation. The following 
methods of separating data [30] are used in engineering studies: 
• Method A: single break down 
• Method B: elimination of variable 
• Method C: rearrangements of data 
• Method D: designed experiments 
Followings are the type of assignable causes of variation and the tools which helps 
to hunt down the assignable cause of variation. 
The assignable cause of variation are: 
• Assign new employers (developer or designer, etc.) to an underdeveloping 
software without sufficient understanding of current software 
• insufficient and incorrect specifications 
• misunderstand specifications 
• insufficient and incorrect testing 
• failure to measure the effects of assignable causes and to reduce them 
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• delays in reporting results of analysis 
• improper usage of algorithm 
• improper usage of language 
• inadequate monitoring of software process 
• improper classification of causes (assignable, nonassignable) 
• incorrect information about the data collection form 
• insufficient instruction on the new data collection form 
• others 
More suspected assignable causes need to be enumerated to trace down the 
causes effectively. However, it is not possible to write down all possible assignable 
causes because the characteristics of these variations are unpredictable, unnatural, 
inconsistent, and nonhomogeneous. So, when any other evidence or suspicion of the 
existence of assignable causes were found, separate the data according to suspected 
sources. 
Other tools that might help supervisor to hunt down the assignable causes are: 
• fish-bone diagram 
• cause and effect diagram 
5.2.7 Causes elimination 
Before the elimination of the assignable cause that is suspected as the cause 
of unusual variation, determine whether the real cause have been found. After the 
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elimination of the assignable cause, it is important to check the process returns to 
stable state. 
5.3 Use of Statistical Control Techniques 
As Cho [12] claimed in his work, one of the most important design step that is 
missing during the modeling phase in the current software industry is input descrip­
tions. During requirement specification, the types of input data and the rules for 
using input data should be specified and refined. To do this, we will use the SIAD 
tree which will help not only to find the location of errors but also to construct the 
quality control charts. The types of SIAD trees are regular, weighted, ruled and 
network. 
In the software development process, each phase of development should have 
a quality goal or performance measure. The quality performance measure, first of 
all, needs to be defined as a vector of quantitative measure based on important 
variables that can be tracked over program operation time. The vector consists of 
attributes such as failure intensity along with its confidence limits, failure removal 
capacity, hardware-related software, and so forth. 
Second, the statistically controlled r-chart, run-chart, p-chart and other re­
gression techniques will be constructed and analyzed to monitor and control the 
software process. Finally, the statistically controlled software system's performance 
will be demonstrated and predicted in the immediately followed life-cycle phase. 
This will relate to additional resource (e.g., computation time, failures, and per­
sonnel) needed to achieve a specified goal, such as reliability, understandability, 
efficiency, structure. 
I l l  
5.4 Use of Fault Tree and Event Tree Analyses 
Regardless of how refined and correct the product is, the degree of quality of 
conformance achieved varied from one product unit to the next. The statistical 
evidence of instability of the software development system should thus be carefully 
examined. Hence, a standard and generic software development system will be 
carried out by applying Deming's management philosophy. 
It is obvious that the type of action required to reduce special cause of variation 
is totally different from the action required to reduce common causes variation 
from the system itself, and those common causes could be any or a combination of 
possibilities. 
• poor design of product 
• poor design of software 
• insufficient and incorrect specifications 
• poor instruction and poor supervision 
• insufficient and incorrect testing 
• failure to measure the effects of common causes and to reduce them 
• failure to provide programmers with information in statistical form that shows 
them where they could improve their performance and the uniformity of the 
product 
• incoming materials (such as computer languages, existing software mathemat­
ical packages) are not suited to the requirement 
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o others. 
According to Dr. Deming's experience [15], the main cause of most troubles 
and the greatest possibility for improvement belong to the system not the workers. 
For instance, slow response and numerical error may require the whole module to 
be rewritten by use of a new algorithm. An event tree and fault tree analysis will 
be used to identify the critical flaws in the software development, to distinguish a 
special cause of variation from a common cause of variation, and to aid management 
in taking the proper action required to reduce the given cause of the variation. 
Consequently, this event tree and fault tree analysis reduces risk (e.g., high failure 
rate) due to common cause failures. Risk analysis has shown that no matter how 
small events are, they can be amplified to increase system failure. A cost factor 
incurred in each branch of the above analysis will be estimated. Quantity and 
variety of common causes will be determined. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, a new procedure bases on system optimization concept for im­
proving software reliability has been provided. The software reliability-related cost 
function and the reliability function of software redundancy with the common-cause 
failure model have been investigated and provided. In the middle of the concur­
rent coding and test phase, the system and component reliabilities are examined. 
Since more information about the developing software, such as failure intensity or 
failure rate, is readily available at this time, more accurate system and component 
reliabilities can be reevaluated with updated data. 
If the system and module reliabilities don't meet the reliabilities required, the 
resources can be reallocated and the system optimization problem can be solved, 
again with the updated data. A set of solutions along with determined decision 
variables can be obtained. The management chooses a solution from among the new 
multi-optimal solutions obtained. The decision to be made is whether to improve 
module's reliabilities or to increase the number of redundancies of some modules 
through manageable ways. This iteration continues until the current rehabilities 
meet the requirement. 
In the software quality management chapter, a standard procedure using sta­
tistical quality control for eliminating the causes of variation and improving the 
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quality of software has been provided. In the preliminary control charting phase, 
the correlation of two variables based on input domain testing should be examined. 
When the distribution of two variables can not be clearly identified, the data of 
failure rate should be re-examined by changing the sample size. The simplest way 
of doing this is to divide the data into several subgroups by ignoring the number of 
test cases executed. 
It is the management responsibility to detect all unusual variations and to 
remove all assignable causes. The remaining variation must be left to nonassignable 
causes, so that, the process remains in the state of statistical control. 
A lot of work should be done in developing a good testing method. At least 
the standardization of testing method should be done. There are over 80 software 
reliability models proposed. However, many developers have claimed that none of 
those software reliability models works very well. The author believes that many 
software reliabihty models can effectively quantify the quality of software and have 
proven their accuracy and effectiveness in the application of many mid-size soft­
wares. The problem is not in the correctness of those software models but in the 
collection of good quality data that is meaningful and sound in statistically. In 
order to get quality data, a good testing method should be developed. The testing 
method should be able to provide sound data consistently for any kind of software. 
There is a question about the software reliability as being a good software 
quality measurement. The traditional design techniques and testing methods are 
too customized to get statistically sound data. Until there is a good testing method, 
the quality of software may be quantified by use of other tools, say, the reliabihty 
bypass models. 
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As the extension of this study, reliability models for different configurations of 
system can be derived. Cold standby redundant system and multi-version program­
ming are good examples. The reliability model for cold standby redundancy can 
be derived by modifying the Markov process discussed and that of multi-version 
programming can be derived by use of probability theorem. 
In both cases, the analytical system reliability function for generic N-component 
should be evaluated. In the optimization problem formulation, both the available 
resources and system parameters could vary over their expected range either because 
of unexpected resource change or because of the nature of statistical uncertainties 
of the estimated parameters. 
The full set of perturbations can be ordered by investigating the sensitivity of 
all responses to one parameter in a single iteration. Therefore, the major drawback 
of the conventional perturbation method is that the same procedure has to be 
repeated for every decision parameter. A second difficulty arises if an analytical 
form of the system model is not readily available. In this case, the sensitivity 
coefficients obtained from the perturbation method are only approximations. 
The adjoint method is a promising alternative to the above dilemma. The 
adjoint method requires a detailed system model, which is proposed in Chapter 4. 
Once the detailed system model is fabricated, a single adjoint run is to be designed 
to produce exact sensitivity coefficients for all input parameters. 
This proposed adjoint method can 
« provide the management quick response to check the robustness of the optimal 
design of Task 1, which will also help reevaluate all possible outcomes, 
• identify the critical parameters employed in the system optimization and cross 
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examine the effects due to SIAD tree, fault tree, and event tree analysis 
vided in Chapter 5, and 
help maintain an "in-control" state for future software development. 
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